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INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 2013, when the Islamic State, or “ISIS,” was still an 
unknown entity to most Americans, the Senate Armed Services Committee 
called a hearing over the conflict with al Qaeda.1 The senators had two simple 
underlying questions for the executive branch officials before them, which 
surfaced often throughout the hearing: Who is the enemy, and how much power 
have we given the President to decide that question?2 
The ambiguity traces to a statute passed in the immediate aftermath of the 
September 11 attack, the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF). The AUMF authorizes the President to use force against the 
individuals and organizations that committed the September 11 attacks, or 
those who harbored them.3 Though not explicitly named, these entities have 
been widely understood as signifying al Qaeda and the Taliban.4 But since 
2001, Presidents have invoked that statute to use force against other groups 
they determine are connected to al Qaeda, and in places far beyond the original 
Afghanistan battlefield. 
The Senators’ questions thus struck at the heart of one of the thorniest 
legal questions that has arisen in the prosecution of this novel war. When the 
enemy is a global terrorist group—such as al Qaeda or ISIS—rather than a 
state, how does the President’s authority to wage war change as the 
organization expands, contracts, or splits apart, and as new individuals and 
groups support or join the fight? 
To answer these questions, the Committee hauled before it the top 
lawyers from the Pentagon and State Department and peppered them with 
questions.5 The lawyers’ answers generally seemed to placate the Members. 
The President’s power under the 2001 AUMF is not unlimited, they confirmed. 
But under the Executive’s now longstanding interpretation, that statutory 
authority extends beyond core al Qaeda to groups that join the fight, or “co-
belligerents,” a claim they asserted stemmed from a “well-established” 
principle in international law. In other words, as executive officials interpret the 
 
 1.  The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for 
Use of Military Force: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Serv., 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter 
2013 SASC Hearing]. The Islamic State, or “ISIS,” which stands for the “Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria,” is also known as the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), and “Daesh,” which is the 
English transliteration of the Arabic acronym of al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa ash-Sham, the Islamic 
State of Iraq and al-Sham. 
 2.  Though the Administration’s lawyers were not prepared with a list of organizations 
considered to fall within the AUMF at the time of the hearing, the Committee notes state that the 
Administration subsequently provided a “classified paper” to Senate staff, which could have included 
such a list. See 2013 SASC Hearing, supra note 1, at 13. Two years later, in the spring of 2015, in a 
speech before the American Society of International Law, Department of Defense (DOD) General 
Counsel Stephen Preston presented a list of groups against whom the Administration deemed it had 
authority, under the 2001 AUMF, to use force at that point in time. See Stephen W. Preston, Gen. 
Counsel, Dep’t. of Defense, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law: The Legal Framework for the United States’ Use of Military Force Since 9/11(Apr. 10, 2015) 
[hereinafter Preston Speech].  
 3.  Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 4.  See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).  
 5.  2013 SASC Hearing, supra note 1.  
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statute, Congress has authorized the President to use force against groups 
connected to al Qaeda whom international law would construe as enemies of 
the United States. The President’s domestic statutory authority thus turns on his 
interpretation of international law. And this interpretation of Congress’s intent, 
these government lawyers added at further prompting from the Senators, has 
been subject to litigation and ratified by the courts.6 
Well, said the Senators, in so many words, in that case, carry on ….7 
*** 
This study suggests that the Senators should have probed deeper. Behind 
the executive branch assurances of a clear standard for interpreting the 
President’s AUMF authority, founded in a “well-established” principle of 
international law called “co-belligerency,” in fact lay an internally-contested 
amalgam of legal theories based in novel and in some instances flawed 
interpretations of international law. While that amalgam of theories and internal 
tension themselves may operate as some impediment to executive action, it is 
far from the solid and established—and clearly constraining—bright line legal 
principle the Executive has repeatedly suggested. 
This Article traces the origins and evolving narrative of the Executive’s 
modern co-belligerency theory to explore how the Executive shapes the 
boundaries of its war powers. This is also a study of how a creative legal 
theory—intended both to constrain and to defend presidential power—sprouted 
and took root within the executive branch, evolved internally into competing 
legal theories, became entrenched through ideologically opposed presidential 
administrations, judicial deference and congressional acquiescence, and 
 
 6.  Scholars have referred to this kind of abdication of responsibility by the courts and 
Congress through over-zealous deference on matters they should be competent to resolve themselves as 
“a cycle of deferral” or “circular buck-passing.” See Kristin A. Collins, Deference and Deferral, in THE 
PUBLIC LAW OF GENDER: FROM THE LOCAL TO THE GLOBAL 79 (Kim Rubenstein & Katharine Young 
eds., 2016); David Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 
129 (1993). Under Collins’s and Strauss’s theories, each branch defers to what is presumed to be the 
other’s resolution of the matter, but in fact “no one ever addresses the constitutional issue.” Strauss, 
supra at 129. In this case, the issue is one of statutory interpretation; yet these Members of Congress 
have generally deferred to the courts’ view of Congress’s intent. 
 7.  Though many bills have been proposed in the three years since that hearing, particularly 
in light of the emerging threat from ISIS, Congress has yet to amend the 2001 AUMF, or pass new 
legislation, either restricting or expanding that grant of authority. It has, however, continued to 
appropriate funds for the ongoing conflict. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 28, Smith v. Obama, 
No. 16-843 (D.D.C. July 11, 2016), ECF No. 9 (detailing Congress’s appropriations and suggesting that 
this serves as a form of ratification of the Executive’s activities). There have been subsequent exchanges 
between executive branch officials and senate and congressional committees, but I have uncovered none 
that have provided significant additional illumination. Shortly following the 2013 hearing, the Senate 
Armed Services Committee sent a letter to the Attorney General inquiring, inter alia: “If the United 
States is authorized to use military force against a state or non-state actor under domestic and 
international law, does that authority extend, without having to be explicit and without the need for 
further authorization, to co-belligerents who have aligned themselves with that entity and joined the 
fight against the United States?” SASC Letter of May 17, 2013 (on file with YJIL). The Committee did 
not clarify whether it was questioning the United States authority as a whole, or the President’s, or 
whether the “authorization” at issue was the AUMF or some other domestic or international law 
authority, but it did request the Executive’s supporting analysis. Id. The Executive has since released 
reports naming the groups it has determined to be associated forces of al Qaeda, and thus to fall within 
the AUMF. E.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON ASSOCIATED FORCES (2014). In that report, the 
Executive explicitly reserves the right to label additional groups as associated forces “whenever a 
situation arises.” Id. at 3.  
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ultimately became the poorly understood law of the land and a basis for 
perpetuating an aggressive scope of unilateral executive power and expanding 
war. 
The role of interpretation is critical to our inquiry. Whatever the 
theoretical scope of the U.S. President’s power to wage war, the President’s 
own interpretation of his authority to use force—or more accurately, the 
interpretation of the lawyers and policy makers working on these matters 
within the executive branch—is often determinative of executive war powers in 
practice. In today’s non-traditional conflict with al Qaeda and now, to an 
increasing degree, ISIS, the potential for novel interpretation is enormous. To 
this very day, debate continues both inside and outside the executive branch 
over the appropriate scope of the President’s war powers in this conflict, from 
those who would have the President receive absolute deference to those who 
demand that the President return to Congress for any extension of the conflict 
beyond those core forces behind the 9/11 attacks.8 And executive branch 
lawyers through two administrations have struggled to apply the laws 
developed for traditional state-to-state wars to this novel and evolving conflict 
with a non-state terrorist organization. There are few simple answers, and 
despite an unprecedented amount of public discourse in recent years over the 
Executive’s wartime actions and legal positions, much remains undertheorized, 
secret, or both. 
As a practical matter, the Executive’s current ambiguity over its co-
belligerency theory is likely borne in part out of the political tension between 
seeking to cabin the war, on the one hand, and providing sufficient flexibility to 
the Executive to meet an evolving threat without having to continuously face 
off against a hostile Congress, on the other. But whatever the reason for the 
Executive’s opacity, as things stand today, the public can only discover that we 
are at war with a particular group not because Congress declares it, not because 
the Executive declares it, not even because the group attacks us,9 but rather 
because we attack them.10 
 
 8.  See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal & Steve I. Vladeck, After the AUMF, 4 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY 
J. 115, 119 (2014) (arguing that statutory use-of-force authorizations be “carefully calibrated to the 
specific threat posed by an identifiable group, and limited in scope and duration”); Robert J. Delahunty 
& John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against 
Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
487 (2001) (arguing that the President has broad constitutional authority to determine when to use 
military force); Michael Ramsey, Must Congress Approve Attacks on IS in Libya?, ORIGINALISM BLOG 
(August 3, 2016, 6:37 AM), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2016/08/must-
congress-approve-attacks-on-is-in-libyamichael-ramsey.html (arguing that in a defensive context, 
“[o]nce the war begins, the President may fight it, in the ways the President thinks best”). 
 9.  As I explain in Part I, it is not clear to what extent the Executive’s current test for a 
group’s entry into the conflict, and thus categorization as an “associated force” covered by the AUMF, 
relies upon a direct initiation of active violence or hostilities by that group. 
 10.  Even then, the public learns this information only if the Executive discloses it or confirms 
it when uncovered by a third party. And we can infer from such an action only that the Executive has 
determined it has authority to attack a particular actor. We still cannot be sure of the legal theory for the 
Executive’s use of force unless the Executive discloses that information. For example, as the discussion 
of al-Shabaab, infra, demonstrates, a U.S. strike does not always reveal a determination that the entire 
group is an “associated force” engaged in an armed conflict with the United States. 
COBELLIGERENCY_MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/27/16  3:00 PM 
2016] Co-Belligerency 71 
  
Reliance on co-belligerency to understand the scope of the AUMF has 
evolved in the course of the conflict with al Qaeda and new groups as they have 
gained prominence. This interpretive device will increasingly determine the 
course of today’s conflict with ISIS, and perhaps even tomorrow’s conflict with 
an entity as yet unknown to us. The Administration’s claim in extending its 
AUMF authority to ISIS itself does not rest on co-belligerency, but the concept 
is equally applicable to the ISIS conflict. Executive officials claim that ISIS is a 
direct successor or splinter of al Qaeda, and, as such, the AUMF applies 
equally to the use of force against it just as it would if al Qaeda had simply 
changed its name.11 The logic of that rationale suggests that legally, ISIS stands 
in al Qaeda’s shoes, and all of the Executive’s claimed AUMF authorities 
against al Qaeda should apply equally to ISIS. If the AUMF provides the 
President with the power to fight co-belligerents of al Qaeda (however “co-
belligerent” might ultimately be defined), then it authorizes the President to 
fight co-belligerents of ISIS. And so too will it authorize the President to fight 
co-belligerents of any group the Executive deems a successor to al Qaeda or 
ISIS going forward, until the courts or Congress intervene to oppose or clarify 
this interpretation. 
To be sure, the President does not claim unbounded authority. Executive 
branch officials have taken care to justify their legal position by reference to 
what they say are existing rules that both justify and limit their actions. This is 
an effective approach. In fact, it is through binding itself to a professed legal 
constraint that the Executive has at times managed to retain for itself significant 
flexibility.12 As I have argued elsewhere, the Executive has throughout history 
softened its claims to enhanced domestic power by calling on limiting 
principles drawn from international law; yet these international law limiting 
principles do not always provide the clear constraints the Executive’s 
invocation suggests.13 The concerns I will address in this Article lie not, 
therefore, in the Executive’s lack of a professed legal position. The problem is 
that the professed legal position—while generally accepted in principle at a 
superficial level by the courts and Congress—rests on an underlying theory that 
is at best poorly understood and at worst, a mélange of competing theories that 
executive officials have never been pressed to finally and firmly crystalize in 
one clear position. 
This Article will proceed in four Parts. Part I lays the doctrinal foundation 
for our inquiry. It sifts through the public debris of executive branch decision-
making to excavate the actual contours of the Executive’s understanding of its 
statutory war powers. This excavation is itself no simple task. Much of 
executive branch national security lawyering occurs by necessity in secret. The 
information available to us is limited, and yet there are pockets of data that we 
 
 11.  See Preston Speech, supra note 2. 
 12. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY 
AFTER 9/11 (2012) (arguing that the existence of checks on presidential power legitimize presidential 
actions); Rebecca Ingber, International Law Constraints as Executive Power, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 
61 (2016) (arguing that the executive branch has at times invoked constraints on the state imposed by 
international law “as a means of softening its claim to enhanced domestic power”). 
 13.  See Ingber, supra note 12, at 49. 
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can curate and then assemble to construct a more comprehensive understanding 
of the government’s evolving position. Specifically, this Part draws on 
statements by executive branch officials in speeches, congressional testimony, 
legal briefs, press briefings, letters to and from Congress (some uncovered 
through FOIA requests), executive branch reports, state practice, and even 
press reports of internal executive branch deliberation. This Part will 
demonstrate that the Executive’s legal theory for interpreting the AUMF is not 
one clear test, but rather the ambiguous—and I’ll argue largely unintentional—
result of an internally evolving, and internally contested, spectrum of legal 
theories. 
The daylight between the Executive’s professed adherence to a strict 
limiting principle, on the one hand, and the reality of this internal tension and 
resulting operational ambiguity, on the other, suggests that the co-belligerency 
theory operates dangerously close to what David Dyzenhaus has termed a 
“legal grey hole.” 14 As Dyzenhaus describes it, a grey hole is a “disguised 
black hole[],” a “façade . . . of the rule of law,” in which legal hurdles serve to 
legitimize the government’s positions while merely rubber stamping the 
government’s actions.15 Here it is not merely that the Executive has failed to 
explain its co-belligerency theory beyond a simple pronouncement; it is that 
there very likely is not one clearly crystalized operating legal theory at all. Yet 
because all evidence suggests that the government has intended even this messy 
standard to operate as some constraint, and, moreover, that executive officials 
have truly felt themselves hindered in some way by attempts to adhere to that 
standard, I will modify Dyzenhaus’s term for this purpose, and suggest that the 
space in which the Executive’s co-belligerency theory operates might be more 
accurately called grey-ish. 
Part II traces the ambiguity in the co-belligerency approach to a tension 
between two potential theories for extending the Executive’s AUMF authority 
beyond core al Qaeda. One theory, which I term here the “Support Test,” traces 
to the middle of the Bush Administration, at a time when executive branch 
lawyers were first seeking to tie the President’s war powers claims more 
explicitly to statutory authority. The concept makes its first public appearance 
in a few lines in a 2005 Harvard Law Review article by Jack Goldsmith and 
Curt Bradley.16 There the authors derive the concept by analogizing to the 
historic international law of neutrality, arguing that a group becomes a “co-
belligerent” of al Qaeda through the substantial provision of support for the 
group, similar to the level of support that historically would have made a 
neutral state a legitimate target by one of the state parties to a traditional armed 
 
 14.  DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 
3, 42, 50 (2006) (“[A] grey hole is a space in which the detainee has some procedural rights but not 
sufficient for him effectively to contest the executive’s case for his detention. It is in substance a legal 
black hole but worse because the procedural rights available to the detainee cloak the lack of 
substance.”); see also Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566 
(2016) (identifying as “rule of law tropes” areas where the executive branch professes adherence to a 
recognized legal standard, but in fact secretly operates under a modification of that standard).  
 15.  DYZENHAUS, supra note 14, at 3. 
 16.  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005). 
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conflict. This theory remains the most publicly elaborated of the Executive’s 
approaches, but it rests on flawed doctrinal grounds, both in its application of 
largely obsolete neutrality law principles designed for states to a modern 
conflict with a non-state terrorist group, and in its overstating of the 
consequences of a neutrality breach under that historic body of law. At best, the 
Bradley and Goldsmith theory might shed light on the parties against whom 
Congress could have declared war in accordance with international law, not on 
the parties against whom Congress actually did declare war. Neutrality law is 
thus not an adequate source for determining the scope of the President’s 
domestic AUMF authority. 
A second theory, which I term the “Active Hostilities Test,” represents an 
effort by some within the Obama Administration to further constrain the war’s 
scope. It may also represent an effort, though this has never been made explicit, 
to tie the Executive’s approach to an entirely different international law 
standard. That standard, which stems from the 1990s jurisprudence of an 
international criminal tribunal, has the benefit of having been fairly well-
established at the time of the 2001 AUMF, but is not without its own problems, 
in particular that it may be too constraining for the particular question at hand. 
Part II dissects both tests and their likely sources and analyzes their policy 
implications, benefits and concerns, as well as their likely champions within the 
Executive. 
At this point, I will have demonstrated that despite the Executive’s claim 
to a strictly cabined and transparent statutory war powers theory guided by a 
“well-established” principle of international law, the Executive’s co-
belligerency theory is instead secret, malleable, shifting, and, to the extent it 
rests on any external legal foundation, it is a flawed one. Yet despite these 
problems, the Executive has successfully relied upon the concept of co-
belligerency to entrench in both the courts and Congress the general principle 
that it should read its statutory authority broadly, even to cover groups which 
may not have existed at the time of the statute’s enactment. Moreover, this 
broad reading of statutory wartime authorities has now survived two very 
different presidential administrations from ideologically opposing ends of the 
war powers spectrum;17 it will likely continue to serve as the legal framework 
for this evolving conflict well into at least the next administration. Further still, 
considering the fondness of executive branch officials for executive precedent 
in the President’s favor, we can readily envision that reliance on co-
belligerency in interpreting the President’s statutory war powers will survive 
 
 17.  There is debate over the extent of this ideological divide. Some scholars now view the 
practice of the Obama Administration on war powers and executive unilateralism as more one of 
convergence with than divergence from the Bush Administration. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE 
DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, NATIONAL SECURITY 
AND DOUBLE GOVERNMENT (2014); Jack Goldsmith, Obama Has Officially Adopted Bush’s Iraq 
Doctrine, TIME (Apr. 6, 2016), http://time.com/4283865/obama-adopted-bushs-iraq-doctrine/. But see 
Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688 (2011) (reviewing ACKERMAN, 
supra); Marty Lederman, The Egan Speech and the Bush Doctrine: Imminence, Necessity, and “First 
Use” in the Jus ad Bellum, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 11, 2016, 8:47 AM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/30522/egan-speech-bush-doctrine-imminence-necessity-first-use-jus-ad-
bellum/. 
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this conflict and will form the baseline for interpreting future congressional 
grants of wartime authority.18 
Nevertheless, this is not a story of a simple power grab. The co-
belligerency story is a useful case study through which to explore the messy 
reality of executive branch legal positioning and, at times, unintentional 
accretion of executive power. Part III will examine the counter-intuitive origins 
and evolution of this theory, and how we got to where we are today. 
Finally, Part IV addresses the implications of this case study for executive 
power and the efficacy of legal constraint on the President. This co-
belligerency case study reveals more than a doctrinal flaw in a war powers 
theory or an aggressive executive assertion of power during war. Rather, it 
brings to light the underexplored manner in which a creative executive 
interpretation evolves into a greyish legal space. Through the lens of this co-
belligerency case study, this paper explores the roles that legal interpretation, 
misunderstanding, transparency and secrecy, substantive legal expertise in both 
international and domestic law, as well as internal executive disagreement and 
the institutional design of legal decision-making within the Executive, all play 
in determining the real dynamics of presidential power. 
I. CO-BELLIGERENCY AND WAR POWERS TODAY 
Technically, the Constitution assigns to Congress the power to declare 
war. But since the Second World War, the formal practice of declaring war has 
gone the way of the carrier pigeon, and the precise contours of the President’s 
constitutional authorities to defend the state and engage in action short of actual 
“war” unilaterally are heavily debated. It is uncontroversial, however, that the 
President’s powers are at their greatest when he acts in accordance with 
congressional authorization.19 Thus, rather than press the outer bounds of 
constitutional power, and for reasons sounding in politics and policy as well as 
in law, presidents have tended to seek statutory authorizations to use force 
when engaging in conflicts of any magnitude, particularly those involving 
large-scale use of ground troops.20 
 
 18.  See, e.g., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2011) (relying on 
prior Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memoranda to assert unilateral executive power); Trevor W. 
Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010). For a rare 
counterexample, see JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 151-62 (2007), recounting his overturning, as the head of OLC, of what became 
known as the “torture memos,” the legal memoranda from his predecessor’s tenure authorizing 
maltreatment of wartime detainees. 
 19.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his 
authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress 
can delegate.”). 
 20.  Presidents have also historically acted “in accordance with” the War Powers Resolution, 
which requires congressional authorization for engagement in hostilities beyond sixty days, though most 
have not recognized its requirements as constitutionally mandated or even constitutionally permissible. 
See, e.g., Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House 
of Representatives (Dec. 11, 2015) (2015 WL 8488906) (“providing this . . . report, consistent with the 
War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), as part of my efforts to keep the Congress informed . . .”) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Letter From The President: War Powers Resolution]. The Carter 
Administration is a possible exception. See A Review of the Operation and Effectiveness of the War 
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There is much at stake in this allocation of authority between the 
President and Congress over the choice to go to war or enter hostilities. Yet 
despite the large stakes, or perhaps because of them, there is no clear arbiter. 
Courts are generally loath to interfere in presidents’ decisions to use military 
force against an external actor.21 Congress, for its part, has rarely if ever 
engaged its full capacities to interfere with presidential warmaking,22 though 
this may be due in part to the fact that presidents have historically made efforts 
to justify their actions and explain the grounds for their authority.23 
When feasible, presidents have thus typically justified their wartime 
actions by attempting to tie them to some statutory authority.24 And because of 
the lack of external intervention, executive interpretation of the President’s 
authority to use force under congressional authorization is often the whole 
ballgame. In recent years, this executive understanding of the scope of the 
President’s authority to wage war has turned largely on an aggressive 
interpretation of the AUMF, which executive officials justify through the 
concept of co-belligerency. 
In order to dissect that theory, it is necessary first to survey the domestic 
law surrounding the President’s use of force against al Qaeda, ISIS, and 
associates. 
A. Statutory War Powers Today 
1. The Authorization for Use of Military Force 
The President today rests his domestic wartime authority in the ongoing 
conflict with al Qaeda and ISIS primarily on the 2001 AUMF. To the extent 
 
Powers Resolution: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong. 188-190 (1977) 
(statement of Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State) (expressing the “administration’s 
support” for the act). In Kosovo, the NATO campaign went eighteen days past the sixty-day clock, and 
thus technically should have required congressional approval. In Libya, Obama administration officials 
argued that the U.S. participation in the NATO campaign after the sixty-day mark did not amount to 
“hostilities” under the act. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State).  
 21.  This is true even when the target in question is an American citizen. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi 
v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (dismissing case for lack of standing and on 
political question grounds). 
 22.  Congress has a range of options at its disposal for reining in executive overreach, 
including control over defense appropriations. 
 23.  Another reason is that the same collective-action problems that may prevent Congress 
from enacting a wartime authorization may also hinder legislative attempts to thwart executive action. 
 24.  Harold Koh calls this phenomenon “Find the Statute.” See Harold Hongju Koh, War and 
Responsibility in the Dole-Gingrich Congress, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 14 (1995). Even early Bush 
Administration positions that are recalled as claims to expansive unilateral executive power often relied 
on a combination of constitutional and statutory authority. See, e.g., Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (relying on the 
“authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United 
States by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the [AUMF]”); Brief 
for the Respondents, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696) [hereinafter Hamdi Brief] 
(relying on both Article II and AUMF authority for detention). Others, of course, did not. See, e.g., 
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to William 
J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003) (“Any effort by Congress to regulate the 
interrogation of enemy combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander-in-
Chief authority in the President.”). 
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that the President acts outside that statutory authority, he has some limited 
recourse to use force in accordance with the War Powers Resolution,25 but 
beyond that he must assert some independent constitutional authority in order 
to act. An immediate response in self-defense to an attack would surely satisfy 
that requirement. But for an ongoing engagement in a conflict that has no end 
in sight, the President is on surer footing relying on statutory authority. 
Executive officials have therefore taken great pains—certainly in recent 
years—to assert that the President’s actions in this conflict come fully within 
his statutory authority under the AUMF.26 
The AUMF does not explicitly name its targets, crafted as it was in the 
tumultuous days just after 9/11. Instead, it authorizes the President 
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored 
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations 
or persons.27 
The “organizations” in the AUMF are widely understood to represent al 
Qaeda and the Taliban. There is no mention of al Qaeda associates, or of new 
groups who might join the fray. In fact, in the days preceding the AUMF’s 
enactment, executive officials had requested open-ended authority to use force 
to deter terrorism more broadly, but Congress limited the text to this language, 
tying the President’s authority directly to the 9/11 attackers themselves.28 
Nevertheless, since the early years after its enactment, the executive 
branch has—through two ideologically opposed administrations—interpreted 
this statutory authority to reach not only al Qaeda and Taliban forces, but also 
other groups that fight alongside or provide significant support to those forces. 
The Executive has at various points termed these groups “affiliates” or 
“associated forces” of al Qaeda. The Executive’s explanation for this 
interpretation has shifted—in the early years arguing that such groups fall 
within the term “organization” itself29—but ultimately the Executive has settled 
 
 25.  War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (requiring that the 
President get congressional approval for hostilities lasting more than 60/90 days). Presidents have 
inconsistently embraced the War Powers Resolution. Nixon tried to veto it, but more generally, 
Presidents have acted “consistently” with its requirements: neither conceding nor challenging its 
constitutionality. See supra note 20. 
 26.  See, e.g., Hamdi Brief, supra note 24; Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Address 
Before Yale Law School: National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration 
(Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Jeh Johnson Speech]; Preston Speech, supra note 2. 
 27.  Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 28.  See David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and 
Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 71, 73 (2002).  
 29.  See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 06-
1397) [hereinafter Parhat Brief] (quoting Organization, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)) 
(pointing to the reference to “organizations” in the AUMF, and arguing that “a group that joins forces 
with al Qaida or the Taliban becomes part of those covered ‘organizations.’ This result follows naturally 
from the plain meaning of the term ‘organization,’ which is a ‘body of persons formed for a common 
purpose’”). 
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on an argument that congressional grants of wartime authority should be 
understood to include groups that join the conflict. As justification, the 
Executive asserts that this interpretation is “based on the well-established 
concept of co-belligerency in the laws of war,” and is thus grounded in legal 
principles and precedent.30 In other words, the President’s domestic statutory 
authority turns on executive branch interpretation of whom international law 
would construe as our enemies in the conflict with al Qaeda. 
The thrust of the Executive’s argument is that, in enacting this use of 
force statute, Congress must have intended this authority to apply not only to al 
Qaeda and Taliban forces, but also to all groups that join the fight against the 
United States alongside these forces. We can call those groups “associated 
forces” of al Qaeda, or al Qaeda’s “co-belligerents,” a term that has loosely 
identified states fighting on the same side of an armed conflict.31 While the 
Executive points to the international laws of war as justification for its co-
belligerency theory, the purpose here is very much a domestic one: the 
interpretation of a domestic statute granting authority to the President to use 
force. 
2. The AUMF and ISIS 
The Executive’s legal theory for ISIS is distinct from its co-belligerency 
analysis and merits a brief detour here, because ISIS itself will soon be 
enmeshed in the co-belligerency story. The Executive’s position on ISIS is that 
it essentially is or was al Qaeda and split off from the group.32 That claim itself 
is highly fact-dependent and the government has not to date provided a 
standard for how it determined—or would in the future determine—that a new 
group was sufficiently connected to al Qaeda to be considered a successor to 
that group, beyond the conclusory language it has employed in declaring ISIS 
to be one.33 Whether or not the government’s succession position is a factually 
fair read of that relationship, the extension of the AUMF to ISIS does not itself 
hinge on co-belligerency.34But co-belligerency is nevertheless highly relevant 
 
 30.  The Framework Under U.S. Law for Current Military Operations: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Stephen W. Preston, Gen. Counsel, 
Dep’t of Def.).  
 31.  Under the executive branch’s recent explications of its AUMF authority, co-belligerents 
and associated forces are often used as interchangeable terms, but “co-belligerency” is also included as 
one piece of a two-part test defining associated forces. This could either be a drafting error, or could 
suggest that the term co-belligerent is intended as a subset of “associated forces,” and that the Executive 
may have a more stringent test for identifying “associated forces.” The reality of executive branch 
decision-making discussed in this article suggests that both theories may in fact coexist within the 
executive branch. 
 32.  Preston Speech, supra note 2. 
 33.  The factual question of whether ISIS is or is not truly a splinter offshoot of al Qaeda is 
debatable and beyond the scope of this paper. 
 34.  As this Article went to print, new press reports stated that the Obama administration was 
about to disclose to Congress that it was now extending the AUMF to al Qaeda, which, if true, would 
suggest that the administration had decided to deem al Shabab an associated force. Charlie Savage, Eric 
Schmitt, & Mark Mazzetti, Obama Expands War With Al Qaeda To Include Shabab in Somalia, 
N.Y.TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/us/politics/obama-expands-war-with-
al-qaeda-to-include-shabab-in-somalia.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share.  
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to the ISIS conflict for the simple reason that under the Executive’s theory, 
ISIS legally stands in al Qaeda’s shoes. Any legal theory regarding co-
belligerents of al Qaeda applies equally to co-belligerents of ISIS. Like al 
Qaeda, ISIS is connected to a web of terrorist groups with varying allegiances 
and goals, perhaps even more so.35 The group’s interest in promoting remote 
acts of terror and “preauthorizing” lone wolf attacks further complicates the 
analysis.36 Before long, if it has not already, the Executive will certainly face 
questions regarding the applicability of the AUMF to groups that either join or 
support ISIS, just as it has faced with al Qaeda.37 
3. International Law and Domestic Interpretation 
It is worth taking a moment to consider the role of international law in 
informing the AUMF. The question before us, as I noted above, is a domestic 
one: how to interpret which groups fall within the scope of the President’s 
statutory AUMF authority. Scholars have suggested a variety of approaches to 
answer this. Some advocate a strict interpretation that would only include those 
persons and organizations explicitly named and no individuals who joined the 
conflict after 9/11, while others advocate reading flexibility in the term 
“organizations,” looking perhaps to domestic criminal law to consider how to 
understand membership in al Qaeda sufficient to bring new members into the 
AUMF orbit. Some have argued that the President should simply get complete 
deference to decide who falls within the statute.38 
For its part, the Executive’s approach has fairly consistently been to look 
to international law to provide content to the terms of the statute.39 The 
invocation of international law to understand potentially ambiguous statutory 
authority is not itself unusual. In fact, under the longstanding Charming Betsy 
canon of domestic statutory interpretation, courts faced with ambiguous statutes 
must credit the interpretation that would not violate international law.40 
Interpreting the AUMF in light of the Charming Betsy canon would entail 
construing the President’s authority to use force under the AUMF as limited by 
international law prohibitions on the use of force or conduct of hostilities. For 
example, this would mean reading the AUMF to require the President to follow 
 
 35.  See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, Associated Forces: Why the Differences Between ISIL and al-
Qaeda Matter, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 30, 2015, 12:57 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/21621/forces-
differences-isil-al-qaeda-matter/.  
 36.  Id. 
 37.  See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, U.S. Scrambles To Contain Growing ISIS Threat in Libya, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/world/africa/us-scrambles-to-contain-
growing-isis-threat-in-libya.html (citing concerns by intelligence officials of “emerging evidence that 
the Islamic State had turned to its affiliate in Nigeria–the Islamic militant organization called Boko 
Haram . . . to poach young commanders and fighters from al Qaeda’s affiliate in northwest Africa and 
from its Shabab franchise in Somalia”).  
 38.  See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8.  
 39.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Respondents Regarding the Government’s Detention 
Authority Relative to the Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee 
Litigation, 577 F. Supp. 2d 312 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-mc-0442) [hereinafter March 13 Brief]; Hamdi 
Brief, supra note 24; Preston Speech, supra note 2.  
 40.  Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
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the international law jus in bello principle of distinction, which prohibits the 
direct targeting of civilians who are not directly participating in hostilities. 
This Charming Betsy canon, however, which operates to promote 
international law compliance, is not the interpretative mechanism at issue in the 
co-belligerency context. Under the Executive’s co-belligerency theory, the 
Executive reads the AUMF expansively, not narrowly, to authorize force 
against groups not clearly contemplated by the domestic statute, on the grounds 
that international law itself permits such force, not that a different reading 
would somehow violate international law. An expansive reading of the AUMF 
is hardly necessary for international law compliance. In a prior work I have 
referred to this power-enhancing interpretive mechanism as a Reverse Betsy.41 
Relying on international law to enhance domestic power has less clear 
precedent than the Charming Betsy canon of constraining interpretation, but it 
is not novel.42 Executive officials and scholars have long turned to international 
law to understand domestic grants of both constitutional and statutory wartime 
authority to the President, such as the contours of the commander-in-chief 
clause, or a declaration of war, and the extent to which that interplay serves as 
constraining or expanding depends on one’s baseline.43 
I have in prior work discussed potential dangers inherent in the 
Executive’s invocation of international law to aggressively interpret its 
domestic powers, including that it enables a significant delegation of discretion 
to the President to interpret his own domestic authority.44 But as a matter of 
practical reality, this component of the Executive’s approach—that the AUMF 
should not only be understood as constrained by but also read expansively in 
light of international law—is fairly well-settled as a matter both of judicial 
precedent and congressional acquiescence.45 Even more specifically, both the 
courts and Congress have accepted the Executive’s assertion that the AUMF 
should be interpreted to extend to “associated forces” under a concept called 
“co-belligerency,” which the Executive has assured them is a “well-
established” principle derived from the international laws of war.46 
 
 41.  See Ingber, supra note 12, at 62. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See, e.g., David Golove, Military Tribunals, International Law, and the Constitution: A 
Franckian-Madisonian Approach, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 363, 364, 379-80 (2003); Ingrid B. 
Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause 
Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61, 63-64, 73-97 (2007); see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 
635 (1863) (relying on international law to understand the President’s wartime authority); Bradley & 
Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 2091 (arguing that it is likely “Congress intended to authorize the President 
to take at least those actions permitted by the laws of war” and arguing that this is supported by 
precedent and Executive practice). 
 44.  See Ingber, supra note 12.  
 45.  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 
Stat. 1298 (2011); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (reading the AUMF implicitly to 
authorize detention in light of international law’s acceptance of—and limitations on—detention of 
enemy fighters during “active hostilities”). 
 46.  Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009); 2013 SASC Hearing, supra note 1 
(generally questioning executive officials on the concept of associated forces, but accepting the 
invocation of international law to expand the President’s authority under the AUMF); Jeh Johnson 
Speech, supra note 26; Preston Speech, supra note 2. 
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4. Divining The Executive’s Co-Belligerency Theory 
Considering the significant work it does in enhancing the scope of the 
President’s AUMF authority, it is critical to understand precisely what this 
“well-established concept of co-belligerency” actually is. And it is perhaps 
even more important to understand what the Executive intends by it, and how it 
informs the Executive’s interpretation of the President’s statutory war powers. 
After all, what the Executive means by “co-belligerency” in this conflict with al 
Qaeda and ISIS determines the bounds of whom the Executive may lawfully 
detain, target, and kill. 
Taking as given the Executive’s stated justification for an expansive 
reading of the 2001 AUMF—that it must include within its ambit groups that 
become parties to the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda—the key 
question becomes: who are these other existing parties to the conflict? “Co-
belligerents” might be the right term to apply to such groups once we identify 
them, but what is our standard for determining who these groups are? What 
exactly does “co-belligerents” mean? Does it include only those who have 
sworn allegiance to al Qaeda, or can the President lawfully target other groups? 
Does it matter whether those groups have engaged in “active hostilities,” or can 
the President also target with legal force groups who “supported” al Qaeda in 
its conflict? The scope of a fifteen-year conflict turns on the question, but 
surprisingly, the executive branch does not have a clear answer. 
Considering the Executive’s oft-stated reliance on “co-belligerency” as a 
limiting principle for its expansive AUMF interpretation, one might expect that 
this is a concept one could find defined in a treatise of either domestic or 
international law, and that this definition would provide clear content for 
determining when a non-state armed group becomes a party to a pre-existing 
armed conflict. But that is not the case. “Co-belligerent” is simply a fairly 
informal term of identification. It is a label for entities, historically states—and 
in particular belligerent states—that have joined an armed conflict on the side 
of one of the parties.47 It is similar in meaning to “ally,” though it lacks any 
requirement for the formal ties that label suggests. The label “co-belligerent” 
has been used historically, though without great frequency. The term makes a 
rare appearance in treaty language,48 and some U.S. statutes,49 as a means of 
identifying states that are parties on the same side of an armed conflict. And it 
is used today as a label for states that are partners in an armed conflict, 
including states that have joined the United States in its conflict with al 
Qaeda.50 But there is little to no international law content elaborating further on 
 
 47.  See, e.g., MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW of LAND WARFARE 531 (1959) 
(defining co-belligerent as “a fully fledged belligerent fighting in association with one or more 
belligerent powers”).  
 48.  See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (distinguishing “nationals of a co-belligerent state” to the 
detaining power as individuals who do not qualify as protected persons under the Convention, along 
with nationals of neutral states, so long as “the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic 
representation in the State in whose hands they are”). 
 49.  See Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 950(t) (2009). 
 50.  See id. 
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the meaning of the term “co-belligerent” or on what precise conglomeration of 
activities would suffice to make an entity a “co-belligerent.” In short, the term 
itself does no work in explaining when a non-state armed group becomes a 
party to the armed conflict. Instead we must look to other sources in 
international law in order to consider how to determine when an entity’s actions 
render it a belligerent party to an armed conflict. 
Since the use of the term itself does not provide this content, attempts to 
glean the Executive’s understanding of what it intends by “co-belligerent” 
today require a degree of investigative work, to sift through and curate the trail 
of evidence the Executive leaves in its wake. This trail includes statements by 
executive branch officials in speeches, congressional testimony, legal briefs, 
letters to and from Congress, press briefings, executive branch reports, state 
practice, and even press reports of internal executive branch disputes. Divining 
the executive branch interpretation here also requires an analysis of the recent 
history and context that provide the backdrop against which the Executive now 
operates. 
Let’s begin our story at the end, or at least, today (which, when all is said 
and done in this conflict, will probably look more like the middle if not the 
beginning). Today the Obama executive branch interprets the AUMF to extend 
to associated forces through a theory it publicly laid out about halfway into the 
Administration.51 This theory has two prongs: an associated force must be “(1) 
an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and 
(2) [] a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners.” When the Administration announced this approach, it was 
(and remains) the most detailed explanation that executive officials had 
provided to date. On its face it seems to provide clear lines for determining 
which groups might fall within the “associated forces” theory. Yet upon closer 
examination and when read in conjunction with other pieces of data from the 
Executive trail, it becomes clear that there is much interpretive work happening 
behind the terms “entered the fight” and “co-belligerent” that is not 
immediately apparent on the surface, and which may affect the meaning of the 
Executive’s theory dramatically. 
Indeed, while the language of the Executive’s theory—and specifically, 
phrases like “entered the fight,” or “hostilities against the United States”—
might suggest a threshold requirement of direct participation in hostilities 
against the United States before a group may be deemed covered, other 
evidence suggests that it may be employing a lower threshold.52 These sources 
and the limited information we can gather from its practice53 suggest that the 
 
 51.  Jeh Johnson Speech, supra note 26. This article went to publication in December 2016, 
before the end of the Obama Administration. 
 52.  See id. 
 53.  We cannot know the entire set of groups the Executive today determines as falling within 
the associated forces umbrella. But the Executive has at various points publicly named certain groups as 
“associated forces” of al Qaeda. Under the Bush Administration, the Executive argued in briefing in the 
Guantanamo litigation that that East Turkestan Islamic Movement (“ETIM”) and Lashkar-e-Taiba 
(“LET”) were associated forces. See Parhat Brief, supra note 29; Respondents’ Memorandum to 
Petitioners’ Motions for Expedited Judgment on the Record, Boston v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 80 
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Executive may accept some level of support to al Qaeda, and thus as to ISIS as 
well, as sufficient to render a group a co-belligerent.54 
Likewise, it is not clear whether “co-belligerent” is coterminous with 
“associated force” or if it is a subset of the latter term, as suggested by this two-
prong approach in which it appears part of the definition in the second prong. 
The USG often uses the terms “associated forces” and “co-belligerents of al 
Qaeda” interchangeably, which suggests that the term “co-belligerent” and the 
standard the Executive imparts to it may be doing most of the work.55 Either 
way, the Executive’s stated associated forces theory does not provide the 
information necessary to assess the standard under which the Executive 
internally determines the groups that fall within the AUMF. But we can piece 
together additional information about this standard from executive statements 
in briefs, speeches, and other documents, and from the sources the Executive 
has relied upon in the few instances it has litigated this question. 
With respect to executive branch practice, the Executive has not regularly 
provided a public accounting of the groups it deems covered under the 
President’s AUMF authority as “associated forces” in this conflict. But there 
have been some occasions when it has released information that is relevant to 
our inquiry. First, in a speech in 2015, the DOD General Counsel Stephen 
Preston announced the entire set of groups that the Administration at that time 
considered to fall within AUMF authority.56 There is some ambiguous wording 
in the list; in particular it is not clear whether Preston intended to include all of 
al Nusra under the associated force umbrella or only certain individuals within 
the group with particular ties to al Qaeda.57 A decision to include the entire 
group would suggest that the Executive was asserting authority to target groups 
that did not necessarily first participate in active attacks against the United 
States. Similarly, we know from media reports that the Executive has had 
 
(D.D.C. 2011) (No. 05-CV-883). Recently, in the spring of 2015, Stephen Preston listed the entire set of 
groups that the Administration at that time considered to fall within AUMF authority, which included, in 
addition to al Qaeda and the Taliban: insurgent groups in Afghanistan; al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), in Yemen; the Khorasan Group in Syria; and ISIL. See Preston Speech, supra note 
2. 
 54.  This accords with a phenomenon that is evident on the micro level as well: the 
Executive’s reliance on support, in addition to direct or active participation in hostilities, to determine 
individual combatancy. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
 55.  See, e.g., Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Final Judgment Denying a 
Permanent Injunction and Dismissing This Action, Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (No. 12-3176). 
 56.  This list from Spring 2015 is as follows: al Qaeda and the Taliban; “other terrorist or 
insurgent groups in Afghanistan”; individuals who are part of al Qaeda in Somalia and Libya; al Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen; “Nusrah Front and, specifically, those members of al 
Qa’ida referred to as the Khorasan Group in Syria”; and ISIL. See Preston Speech, supra note 2. 
 57.  Id. Since that speech, executive officials have made similarly ambiguous statements with 
respect to al Nusra, which suggest that the group’s status is not definitively resolved inside the executive 
branch. See, e.g., Peter Cook, Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room, U.S. DEP’T 
DEFENSE (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-
View/Article/713174/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-in 
(drawing a line between targeting an al-Nusra member who was also a member of al Qaeda, on the one 
hand, and targeting al Nusra as a group, on the other, but later stating, inexplicably, “[i]n this instance, 
we’re talking about a historic—Al Qaida members who may be affiliated with al-Nusra. Now, al-Nusra 
has been an affiliate of Al Qaida, so it’s in very much—one in [sic] the same”). 
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longstanding internal debates about the status of groups that are somewhat 
more attenuated from the direct conflict with the United States: in particular 
groups like al-Shabaab, whose leaders might have ties with al Qaeda but whose 
foot soldiers may be more focused on a particular regional struggle.58 These 
pieces of evidence suggest that the Executive’s theory does not contain a hard 
and fast rule that a group must first directly attack the United States before 
coming within the orbit of the Executive’s associated forces theory. These data 
points are useful for trying to glean the parameters of the Executive’s asserted 
authority—at least for these particular points in time—but do not provide 
sufficient content to establish an underlying legal theory or understand how that 
theory would apply in specific cases going forward. 
For this we must look elsewhere. The most specific publicly available 
content for the theoretical background for this theory comes from legal briefs 
the U.S. Government has filed in the context of the Guantanamo habeas 
litigation. These briefs suggest the Executive has looked, at least in part, to 
concepts drawn from neutrality law in understanding its modern co-
belligerency approach. Some of these briefs directly reference neutrality law as 
a background source for the Executive’s theory; more often they cite sources 
that themselves rely on neutrality law.59 Taken together, these briefs and the 
Executive’s known practice suggest that origins of the Executive’s co-
belligerency approach trace to a theory—or a modified form of a theory60—that 
Jack Goldsmith and Curt Bradley publicly debuted in their seminal piece on the 
AUMF in the Harvard Law Review in 2005.61 This article is one of the few 
sources cited when the government raises the matter in briefs, and it is the only 
source cited that justifies the use of the co-belligerency concept to interpret the 
reach of the AUMF.62 
I will return to a thorough discussion of the Bradley/Goldsmith theory in 
Part II, in which I attempt to excavate the origin story of the Executive’s co-
belligerency theory. But for the purposes of this section it is critical to know the 
following: first, the Bradley/Goldsmith test proposes that an armed group can 
become a co-belligerent of al Qaeda, and thus fall within the President’s 
 
 58.  See, e.g., JAMES R. CLAPPER, SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR 
THE RECORD: WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 4 (2013) 
(calling al-Shabaab an “al-Qa’ida-affiliated insurgency” but stating that al-Shabaab “will remain focused 
on local and regional challenges”); CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA’S POST-9/11 
PRESIDENCY 274-79 (2015) (reporting on ongoing internal debates between executive branch legal 
advisers over whether to brand al-Shabaab an associated force of al Qaeda); Letter From The President 
to Congress (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/11/war-powers-
resolution (noting a U.S. strike against “an al-Shabaab senior leader who is part of al-Qa’ida”). For 
additional discussion on nuances in the Executive’s legal theory on al-Shabaab, see infra note 75 and 
accompanying text. 
 59.  See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 31, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(No. 09-5051) [hereinafter Al-Bihani Brief] (“The international law concepts of neutrality and co-
belligerency . . . confirm that the ‘enemy’ in an armed conflict can include the enemy’s affiliates.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 60.  See Sinnar, supra note 14 (arguing that the Executive often creates secret modifications to 
terms of art it employs, despite the public’s assumption of the terms’ meaning under standard usage). 
 61.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43. 
 62.  See, e.g., Al-Bihani Brief, supra note 59, at 31 (citing Bradley and Goldsmith for its 
reliance on neutrality law and co-belligerency in informing the AUMF); Parhat Brief, supra note 29. 
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AUMF authority, by providing “systematic or significant” support to al Qaeda. 
Second, Goldsmith and Bradley point to the historic body of international law 
known as neutrality law for support for this theory, analogizing from the 
repercussions that flow from a state violating its neutrality to how we should 
treat a non-state armed group that provides a similar level of wartime support to 
a group like al Qaeda. The third point is less relevant for understanding the 
Executive’s theory but leaving it until later would too significantly risk burying 
the lede, so I note it here only briefly: I argue that there is a small flaw in the 
Bradley/Goldsmith description of the relationship between neutrality law 
violations and the implications for co-belligerent status, and that this has 
significant repercussions for the domestic law purpose for which it is used 
today.63 In essence, I argue that the neutrality-based test does not define the 
parties to the conflict as a matter of either international or domestic law. 
Therefore, this international law-derived test does not fit the domestic law 
purpose. 
The Obama Administration has not exactly embraced the 
Bradley/Goldsmith test with consistency. Aside from citing the article in some 
early briefs, executive officials have not generally referenced the test when 
discussing the associated forces or “co-belligerency” theory. This may be due 
to a combination of factors I will dissect further in Part II, including political 
reasons, such as the fact that both Goldsmith and Bradley had served under the 
prior Administration. But Executive distancing from this particular source may 
also be substantive, and may evince an intent to move away from the specific 
neutrality-law based theory espoused within the Bradley/Goldsmith law review 
article. This distancing, combined with the Executive’s production of a new 
two-pronged approach that includes an “entered the fight” criterion, suggests 
that the Executive’s position has either evolved some distance from the 
Bradley/Goldsmith theory of 2005, or that the Executive has taken great pains 
to suggest that its position has evolved from that period. 
Taken together, we have the following data points on how the Executive 
interprets the scope of its AUMF authority: 1) the appearance of a strict 
approach, announced in speeches, which requires that a group must have 
“entered the fight” and must be a “co-belligerent of al Qaeda”; 2) some residual 
reliance in litigation on a theory first espoused by Goldsmith and Bradley, 
which suggests a neutrality law-derived, support-based test for associated 
forces; 3) ambiguous wording in executive speeches and press statements that 
suggests the Executive may be targeting groups that have provided support but 
have not necessarily first engaged in attacks against the United States;64 4) 
reports, practice, and ambiguous statements by executive officials, which 
together suggest that internal executive actors continue to debate the contours 
of which groups come under the AUMF umbrella, including groups, such as al-
 
 63.  See infra Part II(B). 
 64.  See Preston Speech, supra note 2 (using ambiguous language about al Nusra and 
Khorasan group); see also Cook, supra note 57 (suggesting ambiguity surrounding classification of al 
Nusra members). 
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Shabaab, which are engaged in regional struggles but whose leaders may have 
strong ties with or support al Qaeda. 
This constellation of data points is less complicated than it appears. In 
fact, we have narrowed our inquiry over the Executive’s co-belligerency theory 
quite a bit. We can glean from this information that the Executive’s internal 
position on which groups can be considered “associated forces” or “co-
belligerents” is somewhere between the two following poles: 1) a more 
stringent rule that would cover only groups that directly engage in active 
hostilities against the United States, on the one hand, and 2) a lower threshold 
that would include groups that provide support to al Qaeda—through training, 
weapons, sharing of training camps, or even shared ideology or fighting against 
some common enemy—but have not necessarily as yet engaged in active 
hostilities against the United States. We can call these, respectively, the active 
hostilities test and the support test. As I will demonstrate in Part II, each of 
these legal theories can be traced to a specific source, as well as to distinct sides 
in policy debates, and these policy debates help explain why officials within the 
Executive may be inclined toward one position or the other. 
The outward ambiguity in the Executive’s approach is likely the result of 
continued internal uncertainty and tension over what the Executive’s test 
should be. Decision makers at times employ “constructive ambiguity” to paper 
over real substantive disagreement with careful drafting, thus permitting the 
debate to continue for as long as feasible, to be decided only when absolutely 
necessary.65 This ambiguity may account for the Administration’s continuing 
internal arguments over the extent to which a group like al Shabaab falls within 
the AUMF (or may be the result of that debate), and may also account for the 
odd and ambiguous wording in the Preston speech on al Nusrah.66 Perhaps 
internal actors were arguing about the Executive’s position right up until the 
moment of the speech.67 
All of this suggests that while the Executive has publicly announced a 
strict-sounding test to cabin its expansive AUMF interpretation, that announced 
test may mask significant continued ambiguity and fluidity in the test under the 
surface.  Internal strife continues over the precise contours of the underlying 
 
 65.  See Susan Biniaz, Comma But Differentiated Responsibilities: Punctuation and 30 Other 
Ways Negotiators Have Resolved Issues in the International Climate Change Regime 2-3 (June 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-
change/files/Publications/biniaz_2016_june_comma_diff_responsibilities.pdf (discussing the use of 
“constructive ambiguity” in multilateral treaty negotiation and drafting in order to reach agreement on 
matters still contested); Rebecca Ingber, The Obama War Powers Legacy and the Internal Forces that 
Entrench Executive Power, AM. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2016). 
 66.  Preston Speech, supra note 2 (identifying the “Nusrah Front and, specifically, those 
members of al-Qa’ida referred to as the Khorasan Group in Syria” as an associated force). For an 
example of executive officials using ambiguous language to paper over internal disputes on a legal 
position, see SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 58, at 341-42 (stating that executive officials remained 
“studiously ambiguous” on the legal theory for detaining a Somali prisoner, Ahmed Warsame, because 
different officials held different positions, but agreed that, at a minimum, he was detainable under either 
theory). 
 67.  For a discussion of how speechmaking prompts the executive branch to congeal internal 
legal positions, see Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal 
Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359, 397-403 (2013). 
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legal theory. Among the options executive officials are debating—and possibly 
relying upon—is a different and potentially lower threshold for finding a group 
targetable under the AUMF other than the one that the announced approach 
suggests. In the meantime, the constructive ambiguity that permits the 
continued existence of multiple legal theories preserves discretion for executive 
officials to act on either basis.68 In other words, this continued tension over 
which legal theory will ultimately prevail preserves even more flexibility for 
executive officials to act than they would have if they were to choose one 
theory or the other. 
Despite this ambiguity over its underlying legal theory, the Executive has, 
to date, entrenched the principle of expanding the AUMF to include associated 
forces in both the courts and Congress. And it has done so largely by asserting 
compliance with this limiting principle, a test that it has presented as clearly 
established, pedigreed, and constraining of executive action.69 Ultimately, by 
asserting adherence to a legal principle—even one that has evidently been 
poorly understood or misjudged—the Executive has reserved for itself the 
ability to continue its internal arguments about what the precise contours of its 
theory will be, and perhaps also to continue pushing on the outer boundaries of 
that theory as facts on the ground evolve. And those evolving facts include not 
only the nature of the armed conflict but also the President’s fraught 
relationship with Congress. 
II. SOURCING THE MODERN TEST(S) 
Now that we have established the competing executive branch legal 
theories over the concept of co-belligerency, this Part will dissect them, unearth 
the sources on which they rely, and identify the concerns, policy motivations, 
and practical implications associated with each. 
A. The Support Test 
The support test, under which the AUMF extends to groups that provide 
significant support, but do not necessarily directly attack, the United States, 
made its public debut in Goldsmith and Bradley’s seminal Harvard Law 
Review piece in 2005.70 As I will discuss in Part III, the support test likely 
traces to slightly earlier origins within the Bush Administration itself, but the 
law review article nevertheless was the first and remains the most detailed 
public exposition of that theory. Through two administrations it has been the 
Executive’s key source for this support-based version of the co-belligerency 
concept.71 
 
 68.  See Ingber, supra note 65. 
 69.  For a discussion of the Executive’s explicit reliance on strictly stated legal tests that do 
not necessarily accord with the looser interpretation it may take internally, see Sinnar, supra note 14.  
 70.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43. 
 71.  See, e.g., Al-Bihani Brief, supra note 59, at 31 (citing Bradley and Goldsmith for its 
reliance on neutrality law and co-belligerency in informing the AUMF); Parhat Brief, supra note 29, at 
28, 29, 33, 34. 
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At the time of their 2005 piece, Bradley and Goldsmith had both recently 
completed service in the executive branch. Bradley had left a position as 
counselor to the Legal Adviser at the State Department and Goldsmith had left 
his post as the head of the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice. 
Shortly after leaving the government they co-wrote the highly influential article 
that presented a theory for a flexible interpretation of the President’s statutory 
war powers in the conflict with al Qaeda, which continues to guide 
interpretation of the AUMF today. As one small component of that theory, 
Bradley and Goldsmith proposed a reading of the 2001 AUMF that would 
extend to groups that supported al Qaeda in its fight against the United States, 
arguing that Presidents have historically read congressional authorizations 
broadly to include force against additional “entities [that] had a nexus to the 
named enemy.”72 
Bradley and Goldsmith termed these groups beyond core-al Qaeda that 
should be covered under the AUMF al Qaeda “co-belligerents.” In seeking 
content for determining the scope of application of that concept, they suggested 
looking to principles in neutrality law, under which a state at war was 
historically permitted to respond—at times with force—to neutral states that 
violated their neutrality by supporting the state’s enemies.73 In particular, they 
pointed to the requirements “that the neutral state must not participate in acts of 
war by the belligerent, must not supply war materials to a belligerent, and must 
not permit belligerents to use its territory to move troops or munitions, or to 
establish wartime communication channels.” According to Bradley and 
Goldsmith, “a state can become a co-belligerent . . . through systematic or 
significant violations of its duties under the law of neutrality,” thus making it a 
lawful target of military force by the opposing party.74 
Drawing on this test for modern purposes, the argument is that, just as 
historically under principles of neutrality law a nation might have responded 
with force to other states that systematically violated their neutrality obligations 
in supporting that nation’s enemies, today the United States may use force 
against new entities that provide a certain level of support to its enemy, al 
Qaeda. Incorporating this argument into the domestic statute, in accordance 
with their view that domestic war authorizations should be read expansively, 
the authors suggest that the AUMF should be interpreted to provide the 
President with authority to use force against such supporting actors and groups 
in addition to the core groups explicitly contemplated by the 2001 AUMF, 
namely al Qaeda and Taliban forces. 
 
 72.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 2111-12. As evidence, they pointed to U.S. 
operations against Vichy France in World War II. In that conflict, their argument went, the U.S. 
President did not seek additional congressional authorization before attacking the Vichy forces in French 
North Africa, based in part upon their loose alliance with Germany. But see Ryan Goodman, Debunking 
the “Vichy France” Argument on Authorization To Use Force against Co-Belligerents, JUST SECURITY 
(Nov. 17, 2014, 10:37 AM), http://justsecurity.org/17516/debunking-vichy-france-argument-
authorization-force-co-belligerents/ (“Vichy France should not count as a case of the President waging 
war against a co-belligerent without specific congressional authorization” because, inter alia, “the 
United States considered Vichy a “neutral” not a co-belligerent of Germany.”). 
 73.  See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 2111-12.  
 74.  Id. at 2112.  
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1. Practical Implications of a Support Test 
Under a support test for interpreting the AUMF, the Executive would be 
authorized to use force against groups that provide a certain level of support to 
al Qaeda, even if they do not first initiate direct attacks on the United States. Al 
Qaeda has a web of affiliates with different levels of connection to the specific 
conflict with the United States. Regional groups like al Shabaab, in Somalia, or 
the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), may have at various points in the 
last 15 years shared resources, or even ideology, with al Qaeda, but may 
nevertheless be focused primarily on a localized fight and not on attacking the 
United States. Members of these groups may individually join al Qaeda; reports 
suggest, for example, that internal disagreement within the executive branch 
over the use of force against al Shabaab have at times been resolved practically 
through a decision to use force against only particular actors in leadership roles 
who were also members of al Qaeda, in contrast to using force against the 
group as a whole, which would include foot soldiers who may have had no 
interest in fighting the United States.75 
I noted in Part I reports of internal debates within the Executive regarding 
the scope of the associated forces theory. The Support Test bolsters the 
argument for using force against groups like al Shabaab and others who may 
not have directly initiated hostilities against the United States, but who are 
nevertheless engaged in the sharing of resources with al Qaeda. The extent to 
which such a group would fall within the original Bradley/Goldsmith model of 
this theory depends on the extent to which such a group engages in behavior 
that would be analogous, in a state-to-state conflict, to “systematic or 
significant violations of its duties under the law of neutrality.”76 
2. Problems with the Support Test 
The neutrality-derived support test has some fairly significant doctrinal 
problems. Some concerns over a neutrality law-based approach to interpretation 
 
 75.  See, e.g., SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 58, at 274-79. The legal theory governing 
force against al Shabaab has been complicated even further in recent strikes. In March 2016, an 
American airstrike on an al Shabaab camp killed about 150 low-level fighters, but U.S. sources 
attributed this not to a decision to label al Shabaab an associated force, but rather to a “tactical defense 
of U.S. and partner nation ground force units,” based on the “imminent threat to U.S. and African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISON) forces” posed by those fighters. See Letter from Joe Sowers, Dep’t of 
State, to Charlie Savage, N.Y. Times (Mar. 10, 2016), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2757459-shabab-dod- [hereinafter Sowers letter]; see also 
Letter from Barack Obama, President, U.S., to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President 
Pro Tempore of the Senate, (Jun. 13, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2016/06/13/letter-president-war-powers-resolution (reporting strikes in Somalia on “al-Qa’ida and 
associated elements of al-Shabaab” and specifically on members of al-Shabaab who are “part of al-
Qa’ida,” and other strikes in defense of the United States and AMISON forces). Sowers’s letter carefully 
parsed that, while the U.S. forces were not at this time labeling al Shabaab an “associated force,” they 
were also not saying that al Shabaab was not an associated force. Sowers letter, supra (“The fact that an 
al-Qa’ida-affiliated group has not been identified as an ‘associated force’ for purposes of the AUMF 
does not mean that the United States has made a final determination that the group is not an ‘associated 
force.’ We are prepared to review this question whenever a situation arises in which it may be necessary 
to take direct action against a terrorist group.”). 
 76.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 2112. 
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of the AUMF—such as the incongruity of applying old concepts developed for 
conflicts between states to conflicts with non-state groups such as al Qaeda—
have by now been thoroughly ventilated, though only in recent years and 
possibly too late to gain much traction in curtailing reliance on the test.77 These 
are legitimate concerns, but they almost prove too much. Much of the 
Executive’s legal theories regarding the conflict with al Qaeda look to 
principles from bodies of law that may not have been designed with the current 
circumstances in mind. Jettisoning reliance on analogy as a means of 
understanding the legal rules for the conflict would mean dismantling the 
United States’ entire legal architecture for the conflict with al Qaeda—in many 
cases the constraints along with the powers. It is hard to imagine the Supreme 
Court, Congress, and the President all suddenly reversing course on the 
overarching legal structure governing the conflict. That said, there are deeper 
flaws in the support test that have been overlooked in the scholarship and in 
other critiques of the test, and which there is reason to believe neither Congress 
nor the courts have generally considered. 
3. The Neutrality Law Problem 
Before taking on the neutrality-derived support test on its own terms, it is 
worth first pausing to flesh out the myriad problems inherent in the extension 
of neutrality law principles to a modern conflict between a state and a non-state 
actor such as the conflict with al Qaeda, which alone might be fatal to reliance 
on the test. 
First, neutrality law as a general framework simply does not map onto the 
conflict between the United States and ISIS or al Qaeda, neither as a formal 
matter nor as a functional one. There is a reason that neutrality law does not 
tend to enter modern discourse with great frequency, unless one is chatting with 
a history buff. Many view neutrality law as generally obsolete in the modern 
era; at a minimum any right to use force in response to a violation of neutrality 
falling below an armed attack does not survive the U.N. Charter’s regulation of 
the use of force.78 Historically, in the pre-Charter era, neutrality law developed 
 
 77.  See, e.g., JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-41 (2015); 
Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with Al-Qaeda, 47 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 75, 78, 81, 88-89, 96, 104 (2011); Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents, in TARGETED 
KILLINGS: LAW & MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 60, 70-72 (Finkelstein et al. eds., 2011) 
(questioning whether the concept of co-belligerency can be translated to apply to conflicts with non-state 
actors); Remarks by Hina Shamsi, 104 ASIL PROC. 165, 167 (2010). 
 78.  The U.N. Charter contains exceptions to this prohibition—e.g. for a response in self-
defense to an armed attack—but reprisals for neutrality law violations are not included among the 
exceptions. U.N. Charter arts. 2(4) & 51; see also Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 487-93 (Fleck ed., 1995) (recognizing that 
the U.N. Charter and the practice of states have “modif[ied] the traditional law of neutrality” and in 
particular noting that the U.N. Charter now prohibits reprisals against violations of neutrality); c.f. 
GREENSPAN, supra note 47, at 531 (stating that “[t]he traditional rules of neutrality continue to apply in 
international conflicts which are not subject to collective action under the United Nations Charter” 
though failing to elaborate on what that might mean for the prohibition on using force except under the 
circumstances provided by the Charter). Some elements of neutrality law appear to continue post-
Charter. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (recognizing the existence of neutral powers, several years after 
the negotiation and signing of the UN Charter). 
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to regulate the relationship between states not at war (neutrals) and warring 
states (belligerents).79 States that wished to avoid being drawn into the war 
could adopt “neutral” status. Neutral states were generally required to comport 
with the twin duties of non-participation in the conflict and impartiality as 
between the belligerent parties. 
Neutrality law also governed the remedies for belligerent states to 
retaliate against violations of neutrality by neutral states. Such recourse ran the 
gamut from protest to financial compensation to reprisals to declarations of 
war.80 A violation of neutrality did not by itself spell the end of neutrality.81 
And not every violation of neutrality brought about a right of reprisal by force 
in return.82 Moreover, even violations of neutrality that were sufficiently 
extreme to warrant a use of force in return did not themselves bring about an 
end to neutrality.83 Rather the choice was the victim state’s; after a sufficiently 
extreme breach of neutrality, the victim state could then choose whether to use 
force or declare war in retaliation against the violator, or choose another 
remedy for the breach of neutrality.84 
Today, scholars disagree over the extent to which any principles of 
neutrality law survive the U.N. Charter,85 which prohibits the use of force 
outside of certain narrow exceptions.86 Those codified exceptions include 
Security Council authorizations and self-defense in response to an armed 
attack. Not included are reprisals for neutrality law violations.87 Even if some 
principles from the neutrality law era continue today, it is unlikely that the use 
of force against non-belligerent states in retaliation for purported neutrality law 
violations survives the Charter, if such acts would not otherwise qualify under 
the recognized exceptions like self-defense. 
If the general obsolescence of neutrality law were not sufficient to render 
it inapplicable to today’s conflict with al Qaeda, there are a few additional 
hurdles. One obvious distinction is that neutrality law developed to regulate the 
relationship between states, and as such did not apply—certainly as a formal 
 
 79.  For a discussion of neutrality law and its relevance to the conflict with al Qaeda, see 
generally Ingber, supra note 77. 
 80.  Id. at 88; see, e.g., GREENSPAN, supra note 47, at 584 (discussing a range of remedies for 
breach of neutrality from protest to compensation to reprisals and declaration of war). 
 81.  See Ingber, supra note 77, at 87-88; see also EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 
BOOK III: OF WAR §§ 95-97 (1758) (States have a “right” to respond with force against those who assist 
their enemies in war, but that a state of war is not automatic; rather states may “overlook” such actions 
rather than “always coming to an open rupture with those who give such assistance to [their] enemy.” 
The opposite result would be “highly inimical to the peace of nations!”)  
 82. See Ingber, supra note 77, at 87-88. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Many scholars trace the “unwilling unable” test to neutrality law. Under that test, a state 
may use force to address a threat on a neutral state’s territory when that latter state is “unwilling or 
unable” to mitigate the threat itself. The unwilling unable test is itself not without controversy, but many 
scholars and states consider it a norm of customary international law, or at least a “well-entrenched 
norm.” See Ashley S. Deeks, Unwilling or Unable: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial 
Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 499-501 (2012). 
 86.  See U.N. Charter arts. 2(4) & 51. 
 87.  Id. 
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matter—to conflicts between a state and a non-state actor.88 Even putting 
formalities aside, the purpose of neutrality law is to impose impartiality on 
neutral states as between the warring parties. No responsible party today would 
argue that states must remain impartial as between a legitimate state and a 
terrorist organization bent on destroying it and killing civilians in order to do 
so. 
It is quite likely that actors within the executive branch have today 
recognized some of these criticisms of the support test. Executive officials 
seem to be at pains to suggest that the co-belligerency theory requires some 
measure of “join[ing] the fight” against the United States, which may suggest a 
test that is higher than “systematic violations of neutrality,” but it is impossible 
to know without further explanation from executive officials. But if these 
arguments against the applicability of a concept developed for relations 
between states have not had much traction, this may be due in part to the fact 
that such arguments could well be levied against every component of the U.S. 
Government’s legal theory for the conflict with al Qaeda. In fact, the entire 
legal architecture of the conflict, from detention to use of force, rests largely on 
analogy to the laws that developed to govern conflicts between states.89 
Moreover, the neutrality law argument has some resonance; if states 
historically viewed certain acts and not others as amounting to acts sufficient to 
trigger a use of force in response, then that might be helpful in thinking about 
how to understand and define modern belligerent acts outside of clearly 
delineated or codified areas like the U.N. Charter. The Charter by its terms 
clearly regulates uses of force against the territory of sovereign states. It does 
not therefore formally regulate the use of force against non-state actors per se. 
Such uses of force raise sovereignty issues when non-state actors act from the 
territory of a sovereign state, and thus implicate the U.N. Charter on those 
grounds, but how to overcome that sovereignty hurdle is distinct from the 
question of force against the non-state armed group itself. The sovereignty 
question can be answered separately: for example, when the territorial state 
provides consent to the use of force in its territory in a way that does not 
provide an answer to what law governs the use of force against that non-state 
actor itself. 
 
 88.  See Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents, supra note 77, at 71. There are some notable 
exceptions to this general rule. During the U.S. Civil War, for example, states recognized the state of 
belligerency between the north and south and undertook obligations of neutrality toward the parties. See 
GREENSPAN, supra note 47, at 584. It is exceptionally unlikely, however, that states today will take a 
similar approach to the conflict between states and al Qaeda or ISIS.  
 89.  See, e.g., March 13 Brief, supra note 39; Memorandum from the Off. of Legal Counsel to 
the Att’y Gen. (Feb. 19, 2010), Lethal Operation Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi; Memorandum from 
the Off. of Legal Counsel to the Att’y Gen. (Jul. 16, 2010), Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and 
the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi [hereinafter OLC 
Memorandum on al Aulaki, July 2010]. 
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4. The Wrong International Law Test for The Domestic Law 
Purpose 
Let us then take the neutrality law theory behind the support test on its 
face. Even assuming that neutrality law in some way informs modern 
understandings of the use of force, and assuming arguendo any applicability to 
a conflict with a non-state actor (a big lift, considering the foregoing), it is 
nevertheless the wrong international law test for this domestic purpose. 
Recall for a moment that domestic law purpose: the interpretation of the 
appropriate outer parameters of a 2001 congressional force authorization to the 
President. The argument by those seeking to read the statute to extend beyond 
core al Qaeda is that congressional intent and common sense mandate it extend 
to groups that “join[] with the Taliban or al Qaida in its fight against the United 
States.”90 In other words, the argument goes, we should read the AUMF as 
extending to groups that become parties to this conflict. 
The neutrality law-based support test does not answer this question, even 
if we accept some application of neutrality law principles to the current conflict 
today. Under neutrality law, a state that violated neutrality could in some 
instances become subject to attack in response, but did not automatically 
become a party to the conflict. The victim state had a choice of response, war 
being only one of the options. Violations of neutrality thus did not themselves 
end neutrality; only a subsequent declaration of war or direct attacks would 
bring neutrality to an end and turn the parties into belligerents.91 Thus 
international law in the pre-Charter era may have made a significant violator of 
neutrality a potential target, but it did not make the violator an automatic party 
to the conflict. Put another way, the difference is analogous to the distinction in 
contract law between a contract that is merely voidable and one that is in fact 
void. A contrary rule—one that would immediately deem the neutrality violator 
a belligerent party to the conflict—would result in more war, or at least the 
inevitable expansion and perpetuation of existing wars. Instead, neutrality law 
created avenues for states to avoid war through recourse to alternative 
reparations.92 
Recognizing that historic right of belligerents to respond with force to 
certain violations of neutrality, Goldsmith and Bradley make a seemingly small 
leap: they argue that under neutrality law, a neutral state was not merely 
potentially subject to attack, but indeed would “become a co-belligerent … 
 
 90.  Parhat Brief, supra note 29, at 30; see also Jeh Johnson Speech, supra note 26. 
 91.  2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 358, at 752 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 
7th ed. 1952). Similar rules governed and continue to govern neutral merchant vessels, which are 
understood to take on “enemy character” only when they are “owned or controlled by a belligerent,” or 
take a “direct part in the hostilities on the side of the enemy.” DEP’T OF THE NAVY & DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS §§ 7.5-7.5.1 
(2007) [hereinafter 2007 COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. 
 92.  See VATTEL, supra note 81, § 95 (“Some authors decide in general, that whoever joins our 
enemy, or assists him against us with money, troops, or in any other manner whatever, becomes thereby 
our enemy, and gives us a right to make war against him: - a cruel decision, and highly inimical to the 
peace of nations! It cannot be supported by principles; and happily the practice of Europe stands in 
opposition to it.”).  
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through systematic or significant violations of its duties under the law of 
neutrality.”93 This is incorrect, however, and overstates the consequences of a 
neutrality breach. In fact, such a violator might risk becoming a target and 
ultimately a party to the conflict, a co-belligerent, but this result was far from 
inevitable. While it might seem like a small distinction, it is a distinction 
backed by a laudable goal: a historic desire to constrain war, rather than to 
amplify it, to the extent feasible.94 And in fact, that desire to limit expansion of 
the war is the precise policy reason for pushback on the support approach 
today.95 
If the Bradley/Goldsmith approach is a slight overstating of the 
international law effects of a neutrality breach, it is one with significant 
consequences for the domestic law argument. For under the Bradley/Goldsmith 
approach, once that support passes a certain threshold, the group is 
automatically a party to the conflict and covered by the congressional 
authorization. Yet the neutrality law does not answer that question; rather, were 
it to apply here, it would leave the decision of whether to declare war on a 
particular group to the victim state and its domestic processes. And who within 
the state makes the decision whether to declare war on a given entity? 
International law does not answer that question. Rather, that is a matter for a 
state’s domestic processes. And thus we are right back where we started: trying 
to interpret the extent to which Congress has authorized the President to use 
force. 
As a matter of international law, by contrast, neutrality law might shed 
light on which kinds of actions in the pre-Charter era might have rendered a 
state a potential target as a matter of international law. But it does not define 
which groups have already joined the fight. And thus, if we are to read the 
AUMF as covering groups that have joined the fight, neutrality law does not 
answer that question. Rather, the neutrality-derived support test might be 
relevant if the theory were that Congress intended to authorize the President not 
only to use force against existing parties to the conflict, but also against any 
parties that could potentially be subject to force under international law, even if 
international law itself would not consider them already to be parties to the 
conflict. This is neither a plausible reading of the statute, nor is it the 
government’s position, upon which the courts and Congress have relied in 
ratifying or acquiescing to the Executive’s interpretation of the statute to extend 
to associated forces. That position is that the AUMF should be read to apply to 
groups that have joined the fight alongside al Qaeda against the United States. 
International law does provide some content that may be useful in 
understanding that question, but it stems from a different source, and it is not a 
perfect fit, as I will explain in the section that follows.96 
 
 93.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 2112. 
 94.  See VATTEL, supra note 81,§§ 95-97. 
 95. Harold Hongju Koh, How to End the Forever War, YALE GLOB. ONLINE MAG. (May 14, 
2013), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/how-end-forever-war (discussing the risk that an overly 
flexible “associated forces” theory could extend the war indefinitely). 
 96.  See Part II. 
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B. The Active Hostilities Test 
The Executive’s “active hostilities test”—in contrast to the support test —
requires that a group have engaged in active hostilities against the United 
States, alongside al Qaeda, or now presumably ISIS, before it may be labeled a 
“co-belligerent” or “associated force.” We can derive the Executive’s reliance 
on this test primarily from two of the data points I describe in Part I: 1) the 
language of the Obama Administration’s professed “associated forces” 
standard, which includes a requirement that a group have “entered the fight 
alongside al Qaeda” and is “in hostilities against the United States”; and 2) 
media reports and practice that suggest that, despite internal debate and 
pressure, the Executive has not to date labeled as associated forces or targeted 
under that theory groups like al Shabaab that are engaged in regional struggles 
and not, as a whole, directly operating against the United States.97 These data 
points—even the Executive’s professed approach—are not dispositive. As 
discussed, it is not entirely clear that the Executive interprets the “entered the 
fight” language strictly to require real violence. And the reticence to label al 
Shabaab or others as associated forces may be as much related to policy as it is 
to law, though this is an area where policy and law are so intertwined that it is 
simply not possible to distinguish which is playing the constraining role.98 
The Executive has never cited a specific foundation for its active 
hostilities test, yet there is good reason to think that it has derived this test from 
a different source in international law. The two prongs of the associated forces 
theory—the requirement that the group be “an organized, armed group” and 
that it has “entered the fight alongside al Qaeda” “in hostilities against the 
United States” —happen to map almost perfectly onto a different international 
law test, and one that more accurately fits the domestic law purpose the 
Administration relies upon for its AUMF interpretation. This is the two-
pronged test that the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia put 
forward in the 1995 Tadić case for determining the existence of a conflict with 
a non-state actor, which I will discuss below. 
While the Executive has never, to my knowledge, explicitly stated that it 
looks to the Tadić test in interpreting the “associated forces” covered by the 
AUMF, this test’s relevance to the Executive’s stated purpose here—
determining whether particular entities have “entered the fight,” or in other 
words, are party to an armed conflict with the United States—as well as the 
striking similarity between the language in the two tests, suggests that it is quite 
likely that the Executive officials who crafted and endorse the “active 
hostilities” approach have Tadić in mind. 
 
 97.  See supra notes 58, 75. It is less clear what the Executive’s position is toward groups like 
al Nusra that occupy a middle ground between initiating direct action against the United States and 
focusing on a regional struggle. See supra notes 56, 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
ambiguous language in the Preston Speech. 
 98.  See, e.g., Naz K. Modirzadeh, Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the 
Transformation of the Law of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War 
Governance, 5 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 225, 229 (2014). 
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1. The Tadić Test 
In 1995, in the admittedly very different international criminal law 
context, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
put forward in the Tadić case a standard for determining the existence of a non-
international armed conflict (NIAC), in other words, a conflict with a non-state 
actor such as al Qaeda, which is today the most well-established test for that 
purpose.99 This Tadić test has two prongs for establishing the existence of a 
NIAC: (a) “protracted armed violence,” (b) between the state and “organized 
armed groups.”100 The ICTY’s purpose in employing this test was in finding 
the existence of an armed conflict in order to determine the applicability of 
international humanitarian law. But the test’s requirement that an armed 
conflict can only exist when a specified level of violence exists with parties that 
meet a certain threshold of organization means that it is also a test for 
determining the parties to a NIAC. 
As noted above, the two prongs of the Government’s stated “associated 
forces” theory share conspicuous similarities to the two prongs of the Tadić 
test. There is good reason, therefore, to think that the Administration—or the 
forces within the Administration that wanted to push the Executive’s standard 
toward an active hostilities approach—had this test in mind when crafting the 
associated forces language. Recall that the Government’s approach requires 
that an associated force be “an organized, armed group that has entered the 
fight alongside al Qaeda” and is “in hostilities against the United States.”101 
That statement is strikingly similar to the Tadić requirements of “an organized 
armed group” and “protracted armed violence” between the parties. 
One of many open questions—even if the Executive is relying on this and 
not the support test—is the extent to which the Executive’s practice as well as 
its internal definitions of “entered the fight alongside al Qaeda” and “in 
hostilities against the United States” map directly onto the Tadić standard for 
“protracted armed violence.”102 Even if Tadić is the original source for this test, 
 
 99.  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 1995). 
 100.  See Tadić, supra note 99, ¶ 70.  
 101.  Jeh Johnson Speech, supra note 26. 
 102.  Subsequent ICTY jurisprudence has further fleshed out the meaning of the organization 
and protracted violence prongs, and what would be sufficient to meet each. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. 
Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 40-49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 
3, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/080403.pdf (discussing ICTY jurisprudence on 
the meaning of “protracted armed violence” and noting “indicative factors include the number, duration 
and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of weapons and other military equipment used; the 
number and calibre of munitions fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the 
fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the number of civilians fleeing 
combat zones,” as well as the “involvement of the UN Security Council”); id. ¶ 60 (stating that “an 
armed conflict can exist only between parties that are sufficiently organized to confront each other with 
military means” and citing factors such as “command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms 
within the group; the existence of a headquarters; the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the 
ability of the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training; 
its ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; 
its ability to define a unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak with one 
voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire or peace accord”); see also Prosecutor v. 
Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 14, 20, 23 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
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it is unlikely that the Executive feels bound by these strictures.103 Regardless, 
there is good reason to believe, based on the mixed data discussed in Part I, that 
the appropriate source and legal theory behind the co-belligerency concept is a 
continuous fount of debate within the current Administration. The existence of 
that debate likely explains some potential for mixed practice, ambiguous 
statements, statements that sound in a Tadić test while separately making 
sporadic references to other sources such as the Bradley/Goldsmith test, as well 
as the lack of any explicit reference to Tadić in the Executive’s discussions of 
co-belligerency. 
2. Practical Implications of an Active Hostilities Test 
Under an Active Hostilities test, only a group that initiated and directly 
participated in real violence against the United States could fall within the 
President’s authority under the AUMF. And were the Executive to conform 
strictly to a Tadić /parties test, only an organized armed group engaged in 
protracted hostilities against the United States might be presumed covered, 
though there is no evidence that Executive officials read the test that strictly. 
Certainly a strict Tadić test, and even the modified version the Executive seems 
to be espousing, likely casts a narrower net than the neutrality-derived support 
test, which, as discussed above, includes groups that might not themselves be 
engaged in active or protracted hostilities, but which provide more indirect 
support to the war effort. A group like al Shabaab, which has not directly 
attacked the United States, would not come within this definition. A group like 
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), however, that has launched 
multiple attempted attacks on the United States and U.S. interests abroad, such 
as U.S. embassies, would come within either definition of an “associated force” 
or “co-belligerent” of al Qaeda, though that group might not come within a 
strict textual approach to the AUMF if it were read to cover only core al 
Qaeda.104 
3. Problems with the Active Hostilities Test 
There are several potential problems with employing the Tadić test to 
interpret the President’s domestic authority under the AUMF. First, the test has 
its origins not in jus ad bellum but in international criminal law, in the context 
of a judicial decision regarding the reach of its jurisdiction over alleged war 
crimes. The Tadić tribunal’s ability to determine the commission of war crimes 
extended only so far as it determined the groups were parties to an armed 
 
Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/hadzihasanovic_kubura/tjug/en/had-
judg060315.pdf; Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 41, 343 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf; 
Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/I-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 39, 40, 407, 408 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrksic/tjug/en/070927.pdf. 
 103.  See Modirzadeh, supra note 98 (discussing how the Executive borrows from different 
bodies of law, mixing law and policy, without necessarily strictly following any given body to the 
letter).  
 104.  al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, U.S. NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., 
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).  
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conflict;105 thus there is a reasonable argument to be made that its test for 
determining the existence of such a conflict was looser than it might have been 
in a different context, were its determination to be employed for the purposes of 
extending a war, rather than to extend its own ability to judge malfeasance.106 
Second, the Executive has not to my knowledge explicitly endorsed the 
Tadić test as a limit on the parties to the conflict, though that is not fatal to its 
usefulness here. The Executive has referenced Tadić favorably in similar 
contexts.107 And there is good reason to believe that the Executive would 
accept that a NIAC exists at a minimum under the conditions put forward by 
the ICTY in Tadić, and that if the U.S. Government departs at all from the test 
it is on the grounds that it is too narrow.108 It is thus a reasonable read of both a 
widely accepted international law standard and the U.S. approach to that 
standard that a NIAC exists at a minimum when there is protracted armed 
violence between the state and an organized armed group. 
Finally, there is an additional problem with the Tadić test that might 
suggest that it is too stringent for our purposes. Tadić is a test for determining 
the threshold for when hostilities have risen from mere acts of violence to the 
level of armed conflict, as a matter of international law. Once there is already a 
pre-existing armed conflict, however, some might argue that the threshold for 
determining whether new parties have entered this conflict should be lower. In 
other words, the “protracted violence” prong might not need to be met for each 
additional group entering the conflict, as long as the level of violence in the 
conflict overall met that threshold. 
As a matter of considering congressional intent, the U.S. approach to 
Tadić is the most relevant, and thus the latter two points are most problematic. 
But neither of these caveats is fatal to employing the Tadić standard as a floor. 
Under each of these understandings, the parties to a conflict include at a 
minimum states and organized armed groups engaged in protracted armed 
violence. Thus, if the AUMF covers all existing parties to the conflict as that 
concept is understood under international law, then at a minimum it should be 
understood to cover those groups that would meet the Tadić threshold: 
organized armed groups engaged in protracted armed violence with the United 
States. Going beyond that minimum floor set by Tadić, I would argue, would 
require new statutory language, because while international law might permit 
use of force in such circumstances, there is no sufficiently well-established line 
to suggest congressional intent to incorporate.109 
 
 105.  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 66-70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 
1995). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See, e.g., OLC Memorandum on al Aulaki, July 2010, supra note 89, at 25-26 (looking to 
international law sources including jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia for guidance on the existence and geographic scope of an armed conflict) (citing 
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 1995)). 
 108.  See id. at 25, 26, 28. 
 109.  See supra, Part I(A)(2). 
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III. THE CO-BELLIGERENCY STORY: FROM INTENDED CONSTRAINT TO 
GREYISH LEGAL SPACE 
At this point I have attempted to demonstrate both that the Executive’s 
position is not precisely what it suggests, and that it is not as clearly 
constraining as Executive officials have held it out to be. Parts I and II deduced 
the likely legal range within which the Executive is operating, the internal 
tension that lends itself toward continuing ambiguity and vacillation between 
legal theories, and the likely sources for each of the Executive’s potential 
approaches. While all of the options for interpreting the AUMF are imperfect, 
Part II demonstrated that some are more doctrinally sound than others, and each 
advances different policy goals. 
It is also evident, as I will discuss further in this Part, that the courts and 
Congress, many within civil society, and even some critical actors within the 
executive branch—in short, those responsible for overseeing and checking 
executive assertions of power—have not sufficiently scrutinized, or do not 
sufficiently understand, the Executive’s actual approach or range of approaches 
to interpreting the President’s AUMF authority. 
So, the theory is ambiguous, the sources are flawed, and yet the Executive 
has not faced real pushback in this realm. How did this co-belligerency theory 
come to be, why does it continue to play such a prominent role in executive 
articulations of authority, and why have the courts and Congress not adequately 
questioned it? 
A. Executive Reliance on a Flawed Test 
Potential executive reasons for relying on an ambiguous or flexible theory 
to understand the scope of the President’s AUMF authority are manifold. One 
simple answer is a purely instrumental one: executive officials may not want to 
foreclose options and thus prefer an approach that gives them as much 
discretion as possible. The neutrality-derived support test likely suggests 
broader authority for the President than an active hostilities test, as it does not 
require that a group actively attack, or participate in active hostilities against, 
the United States before the Executive may take action. Executive officials 
need only determine that the group has provided some level of “support”—
maybe even a significant level of support but still not necessarily rising to 
active hostilities—to al Qaeda or ISIS.110 The combination of these two 
approaches might provide greater discretion yet. Thus, a simple instrumentalist 
explanation for the current state of affairs is that the Executive declares itself 
constrained by a strict “active hostilities” test in order to stave off interference 
and project legitimacy, but that internally, it relies upon whichever test supports 
the action it seeks to take. 
That hypothetical rationale intersects intriguingly with a controversial 
thread in the Executive’s legal position on the micro level, in the Executive’s 
 
 110.  Whether co-belligerents of co-belligerents are covered raises additional questions. 
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approach to individual law of war detention.111 The Executive’s stated position 
on its detention authority includes a category of individuals who provide 
“support” for al Qaeda in addition to those who meet traditional conceptions of 
combatancy.112 As with the Executive’s co-belligerency test, it is not perfectly 
clear whether the Executive’s actual internal position includes support as an 
independent basis for detention (or, for that matter, for related targeting 
authority); its litigation positions in Guantanamo habeas cases have suggested 
that it has attempted to avoid making support the sole basis for authority.113 
Nevertheless, support remains as a basis for detention in the stated position. 
This suggests that at both the micro and macro levels, internal debates over 
how much weight to place on provision of support for al Qaeda or ISIS in 
relation to the Executive’s legal authority have resulted in constructive 
ambiguity in executive branch positions, and ultimately that has meant more 
flexibility and discretion for the Executive.114 
There are good policy reasons to want to nip such support in the bud, and 
a legal argument that would permit the President to use his most aggressive 
tools against such actors is perhaps tempting. This goes beyond the use of 
force. The Executive has, through two administrations, relied upon the AUMF 
for a range of authorities as well as justification for finding exceptions to other 
domestic rules, in the realms of targeting and detention (including of American 
citizens),115 as well as domestic surveillance.116 Extension of the AUMF to 
groups beyond al Qaeda or ISIS—and on the individual level, to a broad range 
of actors providing support to these groups—means extension of all of these 
authorities more broadly as well.117 
Nevertheless, the Executive’s persistent reliance on co-belligerency is 
more complicated than a simple continuous power grab. Despite an 
understandable desire to use the maximum extent of his tools to fight these 
 
 111.  The extent to which the following description carries over to targeting authority is 
unclear, but released documents and recent reporting suggests that the Executive’s targeting standard 
relies in part upon the detention standard that evolved through the Guantanamo habeas litigation. See, 
e.g., OLC Memorandum on al Aulaki, July 2010, supra note 89; SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 58, 
at 282-83. 
 112.  See, e.g., SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 58, at 148-52 (discussing debates over the 
extent to which “substantial support” for al Qaeda could provide a standalone basis for detention). 
 113.  See Ingber, supra note 65. 
 114.  Id.  
 115.  See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 507 (2014); OLC Memorandum on al 
Aulaki, July 2010, supra note 89. 
 116. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTORS GEN., REPORT ON PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM 505 (2009), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/PSP-09-18-15-full.pdf (quoting this 
modification as limiting the program to “al Qa’ida, . . . a group affiliated with al Qa’ida, or . . . another 
group that I determine for the purposes of this Presidential Authorization is in armed conflict with the 
United States and poses a threat of hostile action within the United States”); Charlie Savage, George W. 
Bush Made Retroactive N.S.A. ‘Fix’ After Hospital Room Showdown, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/us/politics/george-w-bush-made-retroactive-nsa-fix-after-hospital-
room-showdown.html (revealing that the Justice Department insisted on limiting the President’s 
surveillance “program to investigations of Al Qaeda, rather than allowing it to be used for other types of 
international counterterrorism investigations, to make the argument that the program was legally 
justified as a wartime measure”). 
 117.  In fact, the legal authority for a controversial drone strike against an American citizen in 
Yemen, Anwar al Aulaqi, rested in part on a theory of co-belligerency between his group and al Qaeda. 
COBELLIGERENCY_MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/27/16  3:00 PM 
100 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 42: 1 
 
threats (particularly in a conflict that does not appear to have an end in sight), 
the Executive has not since the early years of the Bush Administration 
generally asserted preclusive authority for the President’s wartime actions.118 
Rather, executive officials and lawyers have gone to great pains to couch the 
President’s actions within a statutory framework. 
Moreover the concept of co-belligerency first appeared in executive usage 
(at least as a matter of public record) at a period within the Bush 
Administration when some executive officials were quite notoriously trying to 
roll back some of the more egregious assertions of executive power, and 
working to conform the Administration’s actions to more plausible legal 
bases.119 Consistent with this context, the turn toward an associated forces 
concept in its early incarnation was in fact an attempt to narrow the 
Executive’s prior assertions of extraordinarily broad power, in order to bring 
the Executive’s actions in line with statutory authority under the AUMF. Later 
the co-belligerency argument became part of an effort to retain that connection 
to the AUMF, without ceding authority that the Executive had already 
cemented vis-à-vis the courts and Congress. 
Certainly the policy advantages of the current status quo play a role in 
executive branch decision-making, but this instrumentalist account is far too 
simplistic. The reality is more complex and ultimately counter-intuitive; it 
involves attempts to seek to constrain the President’s power within realistic 
boundaries, the complex dynamics of executive bureaucracy, and the stickiness 
of executive decisions once taken.120 To understand how these dynamics result 
in the use and persistence of this test, we must trace its origins and continued 
use by the executive branch over the course of a decade and more. 
1. Co-Belligerency: the Origin Story 
Let us first recall the backdrop against which the associated forces and 
co-belligerency language came into being. In the short days between the 9/11 
attacks and the enactment of the AUMF on September 18, 2001, the Bush 
Administration first asked Congress for significantly broader statutory authority 
than it ultimately received. The Administration’s proposed statute would have 
permitted the President to use force to “deter and pre-empt any future acts of 
terrorism or aggression against the United States.”121 The Administration failed 
to obtain that language, and received instead the more limited authority granted 
 
 118.  For early examples see Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office 
of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Defense, at 34 (Mar. 13, 2002) (“We 
conclude that as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, the President has the plenary constitutional 
power to detain and transfer prisoners captured in war.”); Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel Dep’t of 
Defense, at 19 (Mar. 14, 2003) (“Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of enemy 
combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the 
President.”).  
 119.  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 141-76; SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 538-42 (discussing 
Goldsmith’s overturning of the early torture memos, which were revised and reinstated after his 
departure); Savage, supra note 112. 
 120.  Ingber, supra note 67. 
 121.  See Abramowitz, supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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by the 2001 AUMF,122 tying the use of force clearly to those involved in the 
9/11 attacks. Nevertheless, in subsequent months and years executive officials 
asserted broad authority, in part resting on the President’s plenary Article II 
power.123 In one early example, in November 2001, the President issued a 
“Military Order” that asserted extraordinary authority to detain militarily or try 
in a military commission any alien who “has engaged in, aided or abetted, or 
conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism” or harbored such an 
individual.124 The order contained no required link to al Qaeda, unlike the 
strictures of the AUMF. 
References to “associated forces” or affiliates of al Qaeda came later, and 
when viewed against this history, they can be seen as attempts not to broaden 
but to limit the Executive’s actions to some plausible connection to statutory 
authority under the AUMF, in order to move away from preclusive claims of 
wartime power. Executive officials first referred to “associated forces” publicly 
in a 2004 order establishing an administrative process to review detentions of 
military detainees at Guantanamo, issued partly in response to two Supreme 
Court decisions challenging the Executive’s detention processes.125 References 
to “associates” or “affiliates” of al Qaeda as a means of explaining the reach of 
the AUMF beyond core al Qaeda can be found in that 2004 order and in 
contemporaneous briefs asserting executive detention authority.126 But they can 
also be found outside of core military activities like targeting and detention. 
Recently released language in an internal IG report on President Bush’s 
surveillance program reveals that in March 2004, Department of Justice 
officials narrowed the reach of a particular component of the program, to tie it 
more clearly to AUMF authority. The new language restricted the program to 
“al Qa’ida, . . . a group affiliated with al Qa’ida, or . . . another group that I 
determine for the purposes of this Presidential Authorization is in armed 
conflict with the United States and poses a threat of hostile action within the 
United States.”127 These last two categories look like an early incarnation of 
 
 122.  Many have likewise criticized as “sweeping” the more tailored version of the statute that 
was passed. See, e.g., Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 8. 
 123.  See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 124.  Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 
Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833-34 (Nov. 13, 2001). The Military Order relied on both the President’s Article 
II authority, as well as the 2001 AUMF, but it notably did not cabin its scope to only those entities 
contemplated by the statute. 
 125.  Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Dep. Sec’y of Def., to Gordon R. England, Sec’y of 
the Navy (Jul. 7, 2004) (establishing combatant status review tribunals). 
 126.  See, e.g., Respondent’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, In re 
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d (Nov. 16, 2004) (defining “enemy combatant,” as “an 
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are 
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners”). 
 127.  See IG Report on President’s Surveillance Program (2009), supra note 116; see also Press 
Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director 
for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005); SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 192 (stating that Goldsmith’s 
insistence on narrowing the “Stellarwind” surveillance program to only AUMF-authorized activity “led 
to the first analysis inside the executive branch of which groups counted as associated forces or co-
belligerents with al Qaeda,” whom the NSA could monitor in addition to al Qaeda, under the AUMF).  
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what ultimately would become the Obama Administration’s two-pronged 
associated forces approach.128 
None of these documents suggest what test the Executive was then using 
to determine which groups might fall within this language. And the term “co-
belligerent” itself does not at the time of these documents appear in conjunction 
with the “associated forces” language. But there is nevertheless publicly 
available evidence that suggests officials within the Executive were already 
grappling with the contours of the concept and considering its relevance to the 
endeavor to tie the President’s actions to statutory authority. A published 2004 
OLC memo discusses co-belligerency in a more traditional context: as 
connoting allies of the United States for the purposes of determining the reach 
of treaty provisions.129 In seeking to determine which states might be 
appropriately construed as co-belligerents of the United States, the memo 
grapples with how to understand this concept.130 In doing so, it looks to 
principles of neutrality law and hints at the ideas the Administration may have 
been considering at that time with respect to its associated forces theory.131 
Indeed, the author of the 2004 OLC memo and head of the office at that time, 
Jack Goldsmith, co-authored the 2005 law review article proposing the 
neutrality-derived support test shortly after leaving office. But the 
Administration itself did not reference co-belligerency publicly to support the 
associated forces claim until it was forced to defend its theory, in a 2008 brief 
supporting detention authority over a Uighur detainee at Guantanamo, Hufaiza 
Parhat.132 That brief makes an argument that is recognizably similar to the one 
made by the Executive in briefs and speeches today: the AUMF should be read 
to cover groups that “join[] forces with al Qaeda or the Taliban” and that this 
interpretation was supported by the “established laws-of-war concept of ‘co-
belligerency.’”133 The specific theory in that case was that Parhat had engaged 
in military training at a camp run by the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement 
(ETIM), a militant organization focused on a regional struggle particularly 
against China, but which had ties to and derived resources from al Qaeda, and 
which the government argued was a co-belligerent of al Qaeda.134 As ETIM 
itself was not clearly contemplated by the AUMF, the Executive’s detention 
 
 128.  In the latter these are conjunctive; both are required pieces, not alternative sources of 
authority. 
 129.  Office of Legal Counsel, “Protected Person” Status in Occupied Iraq under the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, 28 Op. O.L.C. 35, 43 (2004) [hereinafter “2004 OLC Memo”]. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Indeed, the predominant source referenced in this section of the memo is the very same 
later referenced in the Goldsmith and Bradley article suggesting the neutrality-derived co-belligerency 
test for interpreting the AUMF, and is later referenced in U.S. briefs on the same subject. See, e.g., 
Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 (D.D.C. 2009); 2004 OLC Memo, supra note 129 (citing 
Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICTS 385, 495 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1999)). 
 132.  Parhat Brief, supra note 29, at 30 (citing the Bradley & Goldsmith article and its sources); 
see infra, Section B. There is also language in the 2006 Military Commissions Act simply referencing 
“co-belligerents of the enemy.” Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(2006).  
 133.  Parhat Brief, supra note 29, at 30.  
 134.  Id. Parhat himself denied membership in ETIM, in addition to disputing the theory of co-
belligerency with al Qaeda.  
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theory relied upon an interpretation of the AUMF that would extend to groups 
sharing resources with al Qaeda. This, and Bradley and Goldsmith’s 2005 law 
review article, was the extent of the public discourse on the test during the 
course of the Bush Administration. 
2. The Test in Transition 
Obama Administration officials came into office prepared to thoroughly 
reconsider Bush-era practices, in part via a comprehensive review by Executive 
Order-established task forces.135 Yet, those planned, deliberative processes 
were almost immediately overtaken by the urgent press of ongoing litigation in 
the Guantanamo habeas cases.136 The new Administration’s detention position, 
including its views on the extension of the AUMF to “associated forces,” thus 
evolved not through the task forces it had established for such purposes, but 
through the course of litigation over legacy detention policies. As I have 
written elsewhere, the development of legal views in the course of defensive 
litigation is a very different process, and is likely to produce very different 
results, from other executive processes for determining a legal position.137 In 
defensive litigation almost all factors—from the actors holding the pen, who 
are generally career litigators, to the institutional Justice Department biases in 
favor of protecting executive power and preserving room for senior 
policymakers to maneuver, to the task at hand, which is zealously defending 
executive practice—weigh in favor of pushing a legal position that is as 
protective as possible of prior executive policies and future executive 
flexibility.138 This is not the forum in which the Executive is likely to produce 
its most forward-leaning, executive-constraining legal positions.139 And it is all 
the more difficult, as we shall see in the next section, for executive officials in 
the midst of defense litigation to dial back executive positions that courts or 
Congress have already seemed to accept. 
The Executive’s initial 2009 brief—or the “March 13 Brief,” as it is 
widely identified—made a few real140 and some cosmetic141 changes to the 
prior Administration’s legal theory. But it continued to rely on the concept of 
“co-belligerency” as support for the government’s argument that it could detain 
 
 135.  See Exec. Order No. 13,492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. Order No. 
13,493, Review of Detention Policy Options (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. Order 13,491, Ensuring Lawful 
Interrogations (Jan. 22, 2009); see also SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 101-04. 
 136.  See, e.g., March 13 Brief, supra note 39. 
 137.  See Ingber, supra note 67, at 378-91. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 390-91. 
 140.  In particular, it disavowed reliance on sole Article II authority for detention, thus tying the 
President’s detention authority entirely to the 2001 AUMF, and it linked this authority to international 
law. The Administration also added the adjective “substantial” to the kind of support that would qualify 
to make someone detainable, but precisely what this change signifies has never been tested. March 13 
Brief, supra note 39. 
 141.  With this brief the Administration ceased use of the term “unlawful enemy combatant” 
though the legal theory for detention—that these individuals were analogous to regular combatants and 
thus detainable until the end of hostilities, but unlike privileged combatants did not receive POW 
status—remained the same. Id. 
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associated forces.142 While the March 13 Brief merely mentioned the term, 
subsequent briefs sometimes sourced the concept to the Bradley and Goldsmith 
article and to principles of neutrality law.143 Disparity between the initial brief 
and later references to the Bradley and Goldsmith article might be attributable 
to differences in the level of political or career control over the original and 
subsequent briefs. Recall that Bradley and Goldsmith had both served within 
the Bush Administration, and that the new Obama Administration was keen to 
draw a clear line in the sand from the prior Administration on these matters. 
Press reports suggest that the March 13 Brief reached the highest-level scrutiny 
imaginable for a district court filing; the President himself is said to have 
reviewed it.144 Later briefs would hardly have seen the same level of political 
scrutiny; rather they would have been drafted and filed almost entirely by 
career civil servants, many of whom would have worked on these matters and 
filed similar briefs under the prior Administration. In fact, the top career 
litigators named on the Parhat brief, which first raised the co-belligerency 
theory during the Bush Administration, are the very same named on the only 
two briefs that explicitly cite the Goldsmith and Bradley source under the 
Obama Administration.145 Though these career officials would have operated 
loosely under the supervision of political heads of office, those political 
appointees may not have noticed or cared about the subtle difference of 
choosing to cite a source that supported the very legal theory the President 
himself had previously signed off on espousing.146 
As press reports and the Obama Administration itself suggested in its 
initial briefs, the Administration seems to have filed these first briefs in the 
Guantanamo cases assuming that it would later revisit its policies with the 
luxury of more time.147 But as things so often happen in the government, this 
plan was overtaken by events; the Guantanamo litigation pressed forward as 
did other crises, and the Administration’s detention position ultimately did not 
change much from that initial March 13 Brief.148 If anything, the Executive’s 
position hardened into a more permissive standard as the courts accepted ever-
lower evidentiary burdens on the government, and detainee releases became 
more difficult and politically charged.149 
 
 142.  Id. at 7. 
 143.  See Al-Bihani Brief, supra note 59, at 31; Brief for Respondents-Appellees at 42 n.10, 
Khan v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-5306) [hereinafter Khan Brief]. 
 144.  See DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE 
OBAMA PRESIDENCY 59 (2012). 
 145.  Al-Bihani Brief, supra note 59, at 31; Khan Brief, supra note 143; Parhat Brief, supra 
note 29. 
 146.  Ingber, supra note 67, at 380-81 (discussing the significant authority wielded by career 
litigators in crafting legal positions on behalf of the U.S. Government). 
 147.  See KLAIDMAN, supra note 144, at 58-60; SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 117-21.  
 148.  See, e.g., Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Final Judgment Denying a 
Permanent Injunction and Dismissing This Action, Hedges v. Obama, 2012 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
10884 (arguing that the President “has authority to detain individuals who, in analogous circumstances 
in a traditional international armed conflict between the armed forces of opposing governments, would 
be detainable under principles of co-belligerency”). 
 149.  See, e.g., Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding detention authority 
on scant evidence); Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding detention authority on 
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The Administration was simultaneously facing decisions over whom it 
could lawfully target, and heated debate reportedly raged internally over 
whether to deem certain groups “associated forces” of al Qaeda, which would 
mean that all of their members, not just those high-level officials who might 
have operational relationships with al Qaeda, could be targeted.150 In the midst 
of this debate, Jeh Johnson gave a speech in which he outlined publicly for the 
first time the Administration’s two-prong test for deeming a group an 
associated force.151 As discussed above, that statement left questions open for 
the public, but it has been reported that questions remained open behind the 
scenes as well.152 As the discussion of al Shabaab in Part II indicates, these 
questions are not yet resolved. Debate over the Executive’s position continues, 
and it remains unclear where the executive branch will land on its view of 
whether the AUMF applies to groups that merely provide support to al Qaeda 
and now ISIS, or only to groups that directly initiate hostilities against the 
United States. 
*** 
This narrative suggests, perhaps counterintuitively, that certain Bush 
Administration officials turned to theories and rhetoric regarding “associated 
forces” and co-belligerency as a means of limiting what had been the 
Administration’s early extraordinary assertions of executive authority, and of 
grounding the President’s activities in statutory authority as opposed to claims 
of plenary constitutional power. Obama officials then came into power with 
these positions already entrenched—through a mixture of internal executive 
action, judicial involvement, congressional legislation, and otherwise—and 
thus entered offices that had already expressly linked the President’s actions to 
congressionally-authorized wartime authority. They came into power with the 
intent, or at least the promise, of further constraining dialing back the 
Executive’s wartime positions; yet, in many respects, they retained the status 
quo. More than that, the constructive ambiguity in the Administration’s current 
approach may provide the President with even greater flexibility than the Bush-
era support test, despite its flaws, leaving the Executive operating in this 
greyish space.153 
 
scant evidence and ascribing a “presumption of regularity” to intelligence reports); SAVAGE, supra note 
58, at 300 (noting that after the Christmas Day attack and Obama’s moratorium on repatriating Yemeni 
detainees, “the Administration took increasingly aggressive stances in court”). 
 150.  See SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 274-79 (discussing debate regarding whether to label al 
Shabaab an associated force). 
 151.  See Jeh Johnson Speech, supra note 26. 
 152.  See SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 274-79 (discussing continuing unresolved debate over the 
status of al Shabaab). 
 153.  We cannot ascertain with certainty the differences in the Administrations’ internal 
positions, but Bush-era briefs from 2008 suggest the Administration’s stated theory relied upon finding a 
group actually part of the al Qaeda organization, whereas Obama-era language suggests that an entirely 
distinct group—even one that had parted ways with al Qaeda—could still fall within the definition. See 
Parhat Brief, supra note 29. Contra Preston speech (arguing that the President’s AUMF authority to use 
force against a group does not cease if there is a “split” or “disagreements between the group and al-
Qa’ida’s current leadership”). Moreover, it was the Obama Administration, not the Bush Administration, 
that relied upon this theory (in part) in legal analysis over the targeting and killing of a U.S. citizen 
abroad. 
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It is possible that Obama Administration officials initially retained the co-
belligerency concept because they wanted to preserve the President’s options, 
and were anxious about giving up this power too quickly, before they fully 
understood what they had inherited.154 They may have later kept it either 
because, barring major events, executive decisions tend to stick,155 or because 
changes in domestic politics and world events made them decide they needed to 
be able to exercise such power without going back to the congressional well. 
Internal debates over the ideal interpretation of the AUMF, and the existence of 
multiple internal theories, may have also played a role. Changing course is 
more difficult than retaining the status quo, and thus requires some degree of 
internal consensus or a firm decision maker; internal debate, particularly among 
disaggregated decision makers, will more often result in staying the course than 
a significant change in policy or legal position.156 Executive officials may thus 
have opted for continuing to cite the concept “co-belligerency” for support, 
while continuing to disagree internally over what that concept should be 
interpreted to mean. 
There is another counterintuitive factor that would have put pressure on 
an expansive interpretation of the AUMF. Recent statements by President 
Obama suggest that his reasons for relying on a broad reading of the 2001 
AUMF for his wartime authority rather than returning to Congress for more 
specific authority, are likely less connected to a desire for more power or 
expanded war, but in fact the opposite: a fear that returning to Congress could 
result in an authorization to the President of too much power, and an expansion 
rather than a contraction of the war.157 
And finally, this account does not mean that executive officials perceive 
the President’s authority to be wholly unbounded by law. To the contrary, 
reporting on these internal deliberations suggests that executive officials 
genuinely perceived the Executive to be constrained by an interpretation of the 
AUMF, evolving though it may be, and that they have limited their operations, 
and the debate, at least to within the contours of the approaches I have outlined 
here.158 But however constraining the Administration might feel those 
 
 154.  See KLAIDMAN, supra note 144, at 58-60; SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 117-21 (discussing 
March 13 Brief). 
 155.  See Ingber, supra note 67, at 366. 
 156.  See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of 
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 605 (2001); Ingber, supra note 67, at 
364-66 (discussing the “stickiness” of executive decisions). Political scientists refer to a related 
phenomenon as “status quo bias.” 
 157.  See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense 
University (May 23, 2013) (“I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to 
refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate. And I will not sign laws designed to expand this 
mandate further.”). Nevertheless, an aggressive reading of the President’s wartime powers, even 
statutory powers, appears at least somewhat inconsistent with Obama’s views as a presidential 
candidate. See Charlie Savage, Barack Obama’s Q&A, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 20, 2007), 
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/2008/specials/CandidateQA/ObamaQA/ (quoting Obama as a 
candidate, saying that “[t]he President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally 
authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to 
the nation . . . [M]ilitary action is most successful when it is authorized and supported by the Legislative 
branch. It is always preferable to have the informed consent of Congress prior to any military action”). 
 158.  See SAVAGE, supra note 58, at 274-79, 341-42. 
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boundaries to be, their outer limits are far from clear to outside observers, and 
these reports suggest that they remain ambiguous, flexible, and evolving to 
insiders as well. 
None of this narrative suggests a simple power grab on the part of either 
Administration. But it does suggest that there is much going on beneath the 
surface of executive branch legal positioning that informs and at times muddies 
how the Executive is interpreting the law that binds it, even its own stated legal 
positions. And yet even at a time of extraordinary calls for transparency from 
executive overseers like courts, Congress, and civil society, these groups often 
miss the subtler ambiguities in the Executive’s positions that mask enormous 
legal and policy differences beneath the surface, differences on positions that, 
as with co-belligerency, may turn entirely on the Executive’s internal 
interpretations. 
B. Failures in Judicial and Congressional Oversight 
This brings us to the other, symbiotic component to this narrative. The 
Executive could not have entrenched its expansive interpretation of the AUMF 
without assistance from the courts and Congress who have neither demanded a 
clear position from the Executive on the contours of its interpretation, nor 
suggested one for themselves. Thus this story is also one of failures in both 
judicial and congressional oversight over the President. A purely rational-actor 
view of executive action here—an argument that this is merely an example of 
the Executive making aggressive arguments about presidential power—cannot 
account for the extent to which Congress and the courts have acquiesced in the 
Executive’s position on co-belligerency with virtually no real engagement with 
the substance. 
This congressional and judicial abdication is not for lack of engagement 
generally by the courts and Congress in questioning the extent of the 
Executive’s asserted authority in the conflict with al Qaeda and now ISIS.159 
And thus while the suggestion that the courts and Congress simply want to cede 
the President flexible, unilateral authority to act against any groups he thinks 
have a plausible connection to the conflict may explain the reasoning of some 
actors,160 it cannot alone account for the inclination to find solace in the 
Executive’s position by those who have otherwise acted to check executive 
authority. 
There has been plenty of opportunity for both the courts and Congress to 
dissect and pass judgment on the Executive’s co-belligerency theory. 
Throughout the evolving executive process discussed above, Congress was 
engaging the Administration in parallel, both for the purposes of pushing back 
against what were widely perceived as executive overreaches, as in the area of 
detainee mistreatment, and supporting executive prerogatives like detention and 
 
 159.  See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 160.  See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (arguing that 
international law does not constrain the President in wartime). 
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military trial more generally.161 In doing so, Congress blessed the associated 
forces concept, first obliquely, in the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, by 
referencing the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, and then explicitly, in the 
2006 Military Commissions Act, which defined its jurisdiction over persons 
who are “part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces.”162 Recent 
congressional engagement suggests a continued interest in checking the 
Executive’s assertions of authority in this conflict. Testimony over the 
Executive’s understanding of its 2001 AUMF authority, for example, is rife 
with members’ questions about which groups the President is targeting in this 
conflict, and about whether the Executive’s interpretive expansion of the 
AUMF inappropriately encroaches on Congress’s war powers authority.163 
And yet at no point did any Member of Congress do more than skim the 
surface in an exchange over co-belligerency. In response to questions about the 
reach of the AUMF, both lawmakers and executive officials have simply stated 
that an extension of the AUMF to co-belligerents is supported by the 
international laws of war.164 Even Senators skeptical about the Executive’s 
asserted authority have appeared disinclined to question the international law 
content of the co-belligerency claim.165 Virtually none of these exchanges has 
unearthed any additional content to the Executive’s “co-belligerency” 
approach.166 
Questions of co-belligerency have arisen as well for courts, primarily 
through the Guantanamo habeas litigation. Both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations litigated challenges in court over the detention of individuals 
who were part of forces “associated” with al Qaeda.167 And like Congress, the 
courts have generally avoided dissecting the substantive legal theory behind the 
 
 161.  See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2009 Pub. L. No. 111-84 § 948(c), 123 Stat. 2199, 
2576; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 11-84, 123 Stat. 2574 [hereinafter Detainee Treatment Act of 2005].  
 162.  Id. 
 163.  See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. (2014); 2013 SASC Hearing, supra note 1 
(Senators questioning executive officials regarding the list of groups the Executive considered falling 
under the AUMF, but generally accepting, with no dissection, the concept of co-belligerency). 
 164.  See id. 
 165.  For example, in an exchange among Senators King, Levin, and DOD Acting General 
Counsel Robert Taylor, Senator King expressed skepticism about the Executive’s interpretation of the 
AUMF to include groups not explicitly referenced. He accused the Administration of “invent[ing] this 
term ‘associated forces’ that is nowhere in this document,” and asserting “unlimited” power, which he 
deemed “a very dangerous precedent.” See 2013 SASC Hearing, supra note 1, at 28. In response, 
Senator Levin restated the Executive’s position, that the domestic authority “to use force against a 
foreign country or an organization . . . automatically extend[s] under the law of armed conflict to co-
belligerents . . . , to some entity that has aligned themselves [sic] with the specified entity against us, in 
the fight against us,” to which DOD Acting General Counsel Robert Taylor replied, “That is my 
understanding. You have expressed it very well.” Id. at 29.  
 166.  See supra note 163. The lone substantive engagement uncovered on this involves an 
exchange between a senator and an advocate (not an executive official). Senator Levin asked Kenneth 
Roth, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, whether “under the law of war, for co-
belligerents to be included in who the target or who the named source of attack is, they must, as I 
understand it, join with the named belligerent and that they must also be participating in an attack on the 
United States.” Roth agreed, as long as the “original belligerent” (i.e. al Qaeda) continued to exist. See 
2013 SASC Hearing, supra note 1, at 121. 
 167.  See March 13 Brief, supra note 39; Parhat Brief, supra note 29.  
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co-belligerency concept or its limits, both when ratifying the government’s 
theory, and even when pushing back against it. 
As I discussed above, the Bush Administration first relied on co-
belligerency publicly in its unsuccessful litigation defending the detention of a 
Uighur detainee, Huzaifa Parhat.168 Parhat was part of a group of Uighur 
detainees who had fled human rights abuses in China, took shelter in camps in 
Afghanistan, fled the fighting during U.S. air strikes (which destroyed their 
camp), and were ultimately handed over to U.S. officials in Pakistan.169 The 
Executive’s argument for Parhat’s continued detention was based on his alleged 
affiliation with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which the 
Executive asserted was either an “associated force” of al Qaeda or part of the 
organization itself, under “the established laws-of-war concept of ‘co-
belligerency.’”170 Though the Administration’s internal reviewers of Parhat’s 
case suggested release, he remained at Guantanamo until 2009.171 
Parhat was the first, and ultimately the only, case decided by the D.C. 
Circuit in its statutorily-mandated review of the Bush Administration’s 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal designations.172 In noting the 
Administration’s argument that a group associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban 
might fall within the term “organization” in the AUMF, the court assessed that 
it “need not decide the precise meaning of the term,” because the Government’s 
evidence was in any event insufficient to support its argument.173 Thus the 
court found that the Government had not made its case, without ever grappling 
with the content of co-belligerency or with the outer parameters of the AUMF 
authority.174 
More typically, courts have taken the opposite approach; they have 
simply ratified the Executive’s co-belligerency claim in principle without 
scrutinizing the substance.175 Some have explicitly referenced the concept’s 
 
 168.  See Parhat Brief, supra note 29. 
 169.  See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 170.  See, e.g., Parhat Brief, supra note 29, at 33-34. At this stage, the Administration’s public 
argument regarding co-belligerency was that it required an equivalency between the organizations. See, 
e.g., Parhat, 532 F.3d at 834 n. 4 (“Judge Sentelle: So you are dependent on the proposition that ETIM 
is properly defined as being part of al Qaida, not that it aided or abetted, or aided or harbored al Qaida, 
but that it’s part of[?] Mr. Katsas: Correct . . . . in order to fit them in the AUMF.”). 
 171.  This was based in part on the inadvisability of repatriating Parhat to China, where he 
surely would have faced mistreatment. Parhat, 532 F.3d at 838. 
 172.  Id. at 854; see also Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, supra note 160.  
 173.  Parhat, 532 F.3d at 844. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 140 (2d Cir. 2014); 
Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1936 (2014); see also 
Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 KBF, 2012 WL 1721124, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012) 
(questioning the Government’s interpretive theory generally but finding that position “strongest . . . with 
respect to the definition of ‘associated forces.’ The Government argued that there is an accepted 
definition of what constitutes ‘associated force’ under the Laws of War, which is defined in terms of 
principles of co-belligerency and the Laws of War. Specifically, ‘associated forces’ is understood, at 
least by the Government, to be ‘individuals who, in analogous circumstances in a traditional 
international armed conflict between the armed forces of opposing governments, would be detainable 
under principles of co-belligerency’”). 
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purported link to neutrality law.176 One of the few judges to elaborate on his 
ratification of the theory beyond mere recitation of the government’s standard 
is Judge Bates of the D.C. District Court. Judge Bates justified his acceptance 
of the theory in a 2009 case by describing the neutrality law-derived theory put 
forward by Goldsmith and Bradley in their 2005 article, citing only that article 
and those sources it cites.177 And yet, as I discussed above, it is not clear to 
what extent the Obama administration was, in that 2009 case, intending to rely 
upon or distance itself from the neutrality-derived test of the Goldsmith & 
Bradley article. Thus Judge Bates may have ratified the Executive’s “co-
belligerency” concept in principle, while relying on a substantive standard that 
was not then, or may not now be, the Executive’s intended test. 
So, why have Members of Congress or the Judiciary not engaged more 
thoroughly with the substantive content of the Executive’s co-belligerency 
theory? One reason the co-belligerency concept has taken root and persisted 
despite its flaws is that it is poorly understood. And it is poorly understood in 
ways that do not always lend themselves to easy recognition. Part of this 
problem lies in its mixed origin in both domestic and international law. 
International law experts, outside of a small cadre of U.S. national security law 
wonks, are not generally inclined to follow or to wade into this debate because 
of its specific U.S. domestic law focus. And domestic law players, relying in 
part on the Executive’s rhetoric about the “well-established” concept and 
perhaps lacking the international law expertise to dissect it themselves, may 
assume that the content has a more established pedigree under international law 
than is actually the case.178 
This lack of substantive engagement with the underlying legal theory is 
exacerbated by the chameleon-like nature of the Executive’s position, 
particularly as it is not clear what international law source is in fact guiding the 
Executive’s approach. It is hard to challenge a source if you do not know what 
it is. And the only acknowledged source that the Executive has publicly relied 
upon—the law of neutrality—is not a body of law in which most modern 
lawyers, international or domestic, tend to have significant expertise. In fact, it 
is a fairly archaic body of law that is at least partially obsolete today. 
Congressmen and judges, as well as their staffers and advisers, may simply be 
insufficiently versed in the nuances of neutrality law to be able to spot not only 
its inapplicability, but also the ways in which it is being used improperly. 
 
 176.  See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Hamlily v. Obama, 
616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009). Oddly the only judge to critique the international law underlying the 
co-belligerency theory is Judge Brown who, in an opinion in which she entirely dismissed the relevance 
of international law to the Executive’s detention authority, stated that even were it to apply, “the laws of 
co-belligerency affording notice of war and the choice to remain neutral have only applied to nation 
states. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 74 (1906). The [detainee’s group] clearly 
was not a state, but rather an irregular fighting force present within the borders of Afghanistan at the 
sanction of the Taliban. Any attempt to apply the rules of co-belligerency to such a force would be folly, 
akin to this court ascribing powers of national sovereignty to a local chapter of the Freemasons.” Al-
Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873.  
 177.  Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 72. 
 178.  See generally Sinnar, supra note 14 (arguing that the Executive relies on “rule of law 
tropes” to suggest it is employing a clear legal standard even when it is not). 
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By contrast, the “active hostilities” test bears striking similarity to a well-
established international law approach to determining the parties to the conflict: 
that of the ICTY’s jurisprudence in the Tadić case.179 And yet there the 
Executive has never expressed a link between its test and that case or 
subsequent ICTY jurisprudence that might provide additional analysis for how 
to approach these concepts of an “organized armed group” or the determination 
of hostilities sufficient to make a group a party to a conflict. Thus the courts 
and Congress and others have not themselves looked to that source in 
considering the merits of the Executive’s position. 
The Executive’s position lacks transparency at every level: what is the 
legal theory, what is the source for that theory, and even whether it is truly 
being forthcoming about its position.180 This is perhaps worse than a simple 
lack of transparency over the Executive’s position. This is not simply a 
function of not providing particular information or a legal theory to the public 
or to other critical actors. The public has generally accepted that the Executive 
has not revealed the facts underlying many of its decisions in the conflict with 
al Qaeda.181 But there has been increasing pressure on the Executive over the 
last decade and a half to provide, if not the underlying facts, then at a 
minimum, its legal positions in this conflict. The Executive has at times 
claimed that it has provided an extraordinary level of disclosure to the public 
regarding its wartime legal reasoning, and this may be true. Nevertheless, as the 
co-belligerency case study demonstrates, the Executive’s public statements 
may not always align perfectly with its internal thinking.182 Or more to the 
point, the Executive is not one unitary being, and the public statements and 
other pieces of evidence that come out of the executive branch do not always 
capture the full extent of the interpretive and policy disputes that may be 
occurring beneath the surface. Ambiguity or flexibility in executive 
pronouncements may be less about an intentional power grab by any one actor, 
and more about an inability to reach consensus internally, and thus a need to 
leave open room for different interpretations or paper over these differences 
between executive officials.183 The result is that the public, courts and Congress 
are left with a false sense of transparency, the mere veneer of a legal rule.184 
This is worse than directly withholding information, because the public is less 
able to recognize that this withholding is taking place. 
 
 179.  See infra Part II. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  There are, of course, notable exceptions. Many NGOs and others have called on the 
Executive to release, for example, concrete information regarding the results of its drone strikes. Others 
have suggested a public accounting of the underlying facts the Government relies upon in reaching its 
targeting decisions. In the context of Guantanamo habeas, litigants have at the very least been successful 
in requiring the Executive to put forward factual information regarding the basis for detention. See, e.g., 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008). 
 182.  See generally Sinnar, supra note 14. 
 183.  Or perhaps the matter was decided definitively in 2012 when Jeh Johnson announced the 
“entered the fight” test, but subsequent debates and waffling within the Executive have muddied the 
extent to which that test is strictly construed. See Jeh Johnson Speech, supra note 26. 
 184.  DYZENHAUS, supra note 14, at 3, 42, 50. 
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With its associated forces theory, the Executive has suggested a 
somewhat strict approach (to an already expansive reading of the AUMF) by 
asserting its two-pronged “entered the fight” approach. It has also left a trail of 
evidence suggesting that internal actors may read into that explicit approach 
more flexibility than it suggests, or that some officials may have a different test 
in mind altogether, and may simply be continuing to rely on the test that they 
had been using previously, and which they at times continue to reference. By 
relying on a concept of co-belligerency without explaining its content, its 
source, or the contours of the Executive’s understanding, the Executive 
simultaneously suggests foundation in an established legal principle and 
muddies the waters.185 It has not, after all, revealed what it means by co-
belligerency in this context. And as this paper demonstrates, there are several 
possibilities. Perhaps the “Executive” in its many component pieces intends all 
of them. 
C. Alternatives to Co-Belligerency 
Reliance on principles drawn from international law and specifically this 
concept of co-belligerency—however it is understood—to understand the scope 
of the AUMF has become fairly entrenched through two presidential 
administrations, judicial deference and congressional acquiescence. But this 
result was not inevitable, and along the way there have been alternative 
possibilities for interpreting the scope of the AUMF available to the courts, 
Congress, and to the Executive. 
One is a strict, text-driven approach. Some scholars have advocated 
reading the AUMF to apply only to those groups specifically referenced, 
namely the Taliban and al Qaeda (which are not explicitly named, but are 
widely understood to be the entities contemplated by the statute).186 Under such 
an approach, the President would need to return to Congress for specific 
authorization in order to use force against other groups, whether or not they had 
an affiliation to al Qaeda.187 Even a narrow reading, however, requires some 
interpretive approach to determining which actors fall within the orbit of al 
Qaeda and the Taliban. In a traditional armed conflict, such a question has a 
fairly straightforward answer: members of the armed forces typically identify 
themselves as such, wear uniforms, sleep in barracks. International law 
classifies such individuals as combatants, who may be detained or directly 
 
 185.  See generally Sinnar, supra note 14 (describing how the Executive’s public invocation of 
traditional “rule of law tropes,” while deviating from them in secret, serves to protect executive branch 
national security decision-making from external review). 
 186.  See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 127-28. 
 187.  Id. at 126 (“If new groups emerge that pose a threat sufficient to warrant independent use-
of-force authority, the government should affirmatively and publicly identify them and obtain from 
Congress specific authorization to use force against those groups.”). Another set of scholars advocates a 
new congressional statute that would provide more flexible authority to the President, requiring him to 
identify the list of groups he was targeting, but permitting him discretion to update that list based on 
Congressionally-provided criteria. See Robert Chesney et. al., A Statutory Framework for Next 
Generation Terrorist Threats, HOOVER INST. (2013), 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Statutory-Framework-for-Next-Generation-
Terrorist-Threats.pdf.  
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targeted at almost all times, but who also have a right to participate in 
hostilities, as distinct from civilians. But in a conflict with a terrorist 
organization, even the simple question of who is a member, and specifically 
who is a detainable or a targetable member, is fraught. The current approach, 
constant across the Administrations, looks by analogy to international law for 
answers for this question as well. But this is not the only viable approach. 
Other approaches for interpreting the AUMF appeal to areas of domestic 
law, rather than international law, to understand its scope. Early executive 
branch explanations of al Qaeda’s structure and affiliations suggested that 
officials looked to the domestic legal definition of terms like “organization” in 
order to determine who might fall within al Qaeda’s scope.188 Other options 
include looking to analogues from criminal law, such as participation in a 
criminal enterprise. Analogues from criminal law generally require a greater 
degree of actual participation in the hostile acts of the organization before 
individuals may be held accountable, in contrast to the international laws of 
war, under which combatants are considered members of the armed force from 
the moment they enlist, regardless of their actual activities. Wartime analogies 
thus cast a generally wider net, and involve less process. For this and countless 
other reasons—including the longstanding precedent of looking to the laws of 
war to regulate the use of force abroad—international law may have appealed 
to decision makers as a better fit. 
*** 
None of the interpretive approaches I discuss in this paper foreclose the 
possibility of Congress providing new statutory authority that more clearly 
delineates the extent to which new groups or individuals may be covered under 
the AUMF or future force authorizations. This cuts in both directions. Congress 
could rein in the President’s current interpretation of the statute; it could repeal 
or revise the 2001 AUMF, and craft a more explicitly tailored authorization in 
its place. Alternatively, Congress could instead clarify that it intends to 
delegate fairly flexible authority to the President to determine the groups that 
should come within the statute. 
In the interim, the co-belligerency theory simply operates as an 
interpretive default rule for reading the President’s use of force authority. This 
theory rests on a legal fiction of congressional intent: that Congress must have 
intended that executive officials understand the President’s statutory war 
powers to extend to groups that join the fight, as that concept would be 
understood under international law. For this default rule to work effectively, 
however, Congress, courts, and the public need to understand precisely what 
the default presumption is. They need to know how the President and executive 
branch officials interpret such use of force authorizations, both for the purposes 
of determining whether to further expand or cabin the current AUMF, and to 
understand how the Executive will read future authorizations. Thus, while there 
are both doctrinal and policy reasons to prefer one test over another, the long-
view imperative is that there be one clear theory by which all these actors 
 
 188.  See, e.g., Parhat Brief, supra note 29.  
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recognize that the Executive will construe this kind of force authorization, 
absent further clarification from Congress. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CO-BELLIGERENCY STORY 
This article makes two primary claims. First, as a matter of both practice 
and doctrine, this article demonstrates that no one, including those within the 
executive branch, has a full understanding of the scope of the President’s 
authority under the AUMF, or even the scope of what the President has asserted 
is his AUMF authority. This has obvious ramifications for our ability to 
understand, let alone to cabin, the current conflict. And if left unchecked, 
today’s murky understanding will continue to govern an expansive 
interpretation of wartime force authorizations going forward. 
Second, this article uses the co-belligerency story as a case study to 
explore how a self-created legal norm can serve simultaneously as both 
constraint and enhancement on executive power. Co-belligerency is an 
executive-made greyish space in the law, a phenomenon dangerously close but 
not quite equivalent to what David Dyzenhaus has called a “legal grey hole.”189 
The co-belligerency story is a narrative of a creative idea that became 
entrenched law, but in the process lost much of its shape. The result has been 
neither a clear limit on Presidential power, nor an executive branch run 
completely amok, but rather an amorphously-defined pool of discretionary 
authority that few if any fully understand. 
This case study also unearths a question about the invocation of 
international law to interpret domestic law. Specifically, how should 
international law inform domestic legal authorities that speak to foreign affairs 
powers, when the international law in question is vague or there is no one clear 
international law rule on point? 
A. The Scope of the President’s Statutory War Powers 
The co-belligerency story suggests that no one really knows for sure how 
the Executive is interpreting its statutory powers in this conflict, including 
those within the executive branch itself. What is clear is that the courts and 
Congress have both failed in their investigation and oversight of the 
Executive’s position. The scope of the President’s statutory authority to use 
force is, after all, a question of domestic law—one of statutory interpretation—
and the Executive’s position is based at least in part on a legal fiction of 
congressional intent. Yet members of Congress have abdicated their 
responsibility to perform that oversight. Some have suggested concern over the 
scope of the Executive’s statutory authority, only to then defer wholly to an 
executive interpretation of that statute without making any effort to understand 
that interpretation.190 Even more tortuous, these very members have taken 
comfort in the idea that judicial sanction for the Executive’s interpretation of 
 
 189.  DYZENHAUS, supra note 14. 
 190.  See, e.g., supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
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their own statute should somehow legitimize that reading and absolve them of 
the need to draw their own judgment of that interpretation or otherwise to 
clarify their intent.191 
This Article has dissected the possible options for interpreting the AUMF, 
and discussed the relative merits and disadvantages to each. But whatever the 
precise test employed, what is most imperative is that there be one approach, 
and that it be transparent and understood by the relevant players: courts, 
Congress, NGOs, and also executive branch officials themselves. The 
substance of that test is important, surely, and scholars, members of Congress, 
judges, and NGOs, can and should debate what that test should be. But to do so 
effectively they must understand what they do and do not already know about 
the Executive’s position. There are many potential approaches to both 
interpreting the current AUMF and to determining future authorizations to the 
President. International law may or may not be an appropriate source for 
determining the contours of a conflict with a non-state actor.192 Perhaps a 
strictly-tailored approach in the text itself is ideal. Or perhaps after thorough 
debate Congress might vote to provide the Executive with significant flexible 
authority. But it is critical that those charged with checking executive authority 
know where that flexibility lies, and where the Executive is operating within 
clearly defined parameters. Wherever the approach ultimately lands, this 
interpretive mechanism is merely a default rule; Congress can draft around it. 
But Congress can only do so—and the courts and public can only judge its 
merits—if all understand how the interpretive mechanism actually operates. 
Today, the Executive’s co-belligerency approach does not provide that clarity, 
and instead hovers dangerously close to a legal grey hole, a mere veneer of law 
that suggests a clearer rule than it truly provides, and which operates to stave 
off interference in the Executive’s position while simultaneously affording the 
President significant discretion to act.193 
B. Invoking International Law to Interpret Domestic Authority 
The co-belligerency story demonstrates that there are reasons to be 
concerned with attempts at international law adventurism when interpreting 
domestic law. While the use of international law to inform domestic rules has 
an established pedigree, it can be abused.194 This is particularly so in the 
modern era in which those charged with checking the Executive’s domestic 
authority often lack expertise in international law. Reliance on international law 
to inform domestic law can instead help to create, intentionally or not, a legal 
grey hole of flexible and amorphous executive power. Here, the Executive’s 
invocation of a little known concept from international law to interpret its 
domestic statutory authority enabled it to promote a flexible and ultimately 
 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  For a discussion of how to determine when international law is an appropriate tool for 
interpreting domestic constraints, see Ingber, supra note 12. 
 193.  See DYZENHAUS, supra note 14, at 3, 42, 50. 
 194.  See Ingber, supra note 12. 
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expansive understanding of that authority with very little pushback from the 
courts or Congress. 
How should international law appropriately inform the domestic law in 
this context, namely the President’s statutory authority under the AUMF? One 
question that this case study raises—and which I will have to reserve to future 
work—is, even when it is appropriate to look to international law to inform a 
particular domestic context, how does one determine which particular 
substantive norm is the appropriate norm to invoke and how does one define it? 
Among the questions packed into this are: Which body of international law is 
best suited to this task? In areas of controversy or disagreement, how does one 
determine which rule properly governs? When interpreting a congressional 
statute, is it necessary that Congress has appeared to have accepted a particular 
international law norm, or is it sufficient that the executive branch espouse it? 
And need the international law norm have been well-established at the time of 
the statute’s enactment, or need it be a well-established consensus opinion 
today? Or is it enough simply that the Executive today deems the norm to be 
the best—or even just a plausible—reading of the law? What does one do when 
there is no appropriate international law test on point? 
The co-belligerency story raises all of these questions. There exists no 
one clear and established international law test that is perfectly on point to 
determine when a non-state armed group joins a pre-existing conflict between a 
state and non-state actor. Executive officials have thus relied on different 
theories over the years. The early test that officials proposed during the middle 
of the Bush Administration relied upon a creative take on the historic body of 
neutrality law to understand the parameters of a domestic statute authorizing 
force against al Qaeda. 195 That body of law was not formally applicable to the 
al Qaeda conflict as a matter of international law, and thus it required a novel 
spin on that law in order to map it onto this context. Moreover, even putting 
aside the applicability of the body of neutrality law as a whole, the Bush-era 
theory required a tweaking of the neutrality law rule itself in order to craft a test 
for the domestic law purpose. 
Under no circumstances could one argue that this novel theory of 
international law was an established or consensus approach to determining the 
parties to a conflict under international law in 2001, when the AUMF was 
passed. Nor was it, at the time, the U.S. Government’s understanding of 
international law governing such conflicts. No evidence suggests that it was a 
consensus approach to international law at any point during the years in which 
the Bush Administration invoked the test to interpret the AUMF. Nor is there 
evidence to suggest that it is the international law governing such conflicts 
today.196 
There nevertheless remains a question as to the extent to which the 
Executive might plausibly promote this understanding of the law governing 
force against non-state actors as a matter of international law. The U.S. 
 
 195.  For the detailed discussion of this test and its problems, see supra Part II. 
 196.  Id. 
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President has some real power to move custom in areas where there remains a 
lack of clarity over the international law rule. But that is not the question before 
us here. The question here is whether this creative theory should be employed 
to inform a domestic statute informing and constraining the President’s power. 
For these purposes the presumption shifts: a lack of clarity in international law 
should not give the President license to interpret his domestic authorities with 
abandon. To the contrary, to the extent international law informs domestic 
powers, we must consider that we can only presume congressional intent to 
incorporate existing international law rules. The extent to which those rules 
must be in existence at the time of the statute’s enactment or in existence at the 
time of interpretation may be an open question. But the neutrality theory fails 
under either theory. 
The Tadić theory is also flawed for the reasons discussed in Part II. But at 
a minimum it may serve as a floor for a more tailored yet still expansive 
reading of the AUMF. Tadić has the benefit of being a well-established test, 
both now and at the time of the AUMF’s enactment. Because Tadić creates a 
standard for determining the threshold point at which a NIAC comes into 
existence, and not for determining when parties join a pre-existing NIAC, it 
may well be that the test for the latter should be less stringent. International law 
may well permit parties to act beyond Tadić’s bounds. And states may wish to 
try to push on those bounds and develop custom in this area. But today there is 
no existing test for what that might be, and thus it cannot serve as a limiting 
principle for an expansive view of domestic authority. Tadić is the only theory 
that passes the brief guidelines I discuss above. This does not mean that 
Congress cannot go further to authorize more discretion to the President 
beyond what Tadić would permit, but without further action on its part we 
cannot assume it. 
There is room for debate over how precisely international law should 
inform domestic law, and how we should define the international law norm in 
doing so.197 I certainly find persuasive arguments in favor of importing a 
clearly established, longstanding principle of international law to help define 
the contours of an otherwise ambiguous domestic statute. I also find plausible 
arguments in favor of assuming congressional intent to keep up with changing 
times and incorporate a norm that has evolved over time to a new modern 
consensus. And I think it might be reasonable to argue the complete inverse as 
well: that we should interpret a statute as incorporating even a controversial 
international law norm that was in play at the time of the statute, if that norm 
was at the time clearly accepted by the United States. But I think it is a bridge 
too far for the Executive and others to assume congressional intent to import 
into an existing statute an international law theory that neither was the position 
of the United States at the time of the statute, nor long-standing generally, nor 
accepted today by the international community as an established norm. For our 
purposes here, while it may make sense to assume congressional intent to 
 
 197.  This case study forms part of a broader project on the distinct ways that international law 
informs domestic law interpretation. A future work will consider how to determine the appropriate 
content of an international law norm when we look to it to inform domestic law. 
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authorize force against all existing parties to a conflict, I do not find it realistic 
that Congress intended in the 2001 statute to delegate to the President the 
authority to declare war against new actors, simply based on an argument that 
international law permits it.198 
C. Checking Executive Power from Without and Within 
Most broadly, the co-belligerency story complicates competing narratives 
today about the potential for the Executive to self-constrain in the absence of 
real external oversight. It is neither a cynical tale of an imperial power-hungry 
Executive, nor a happy account of a presidency perfectly restrained by the 
institutional forces promoting the rule of law humming away within the 
executive branch. Instead, this story both demonstrates and raises concerns 
about the phenomenon that has been called a second-best alternative check on 
executive authority: the internal separation of powers, the web of actors within 
the executive branch who operate to rein in executive prerogative.199 
There has been much interest in recent years in what has seemed a 
demographic explosion of lawyers operating within the executive branch, and 
the significant involvement of these lawyers in all aspects of executive 
decision-making.  Particular attention has focused on executive lawyering in 
the national security arena.200 Presidential powers experts have noticed a 
decline of centralized power in legal offices like the Office of Legal Counsel at 
the Justice Department, in favor of a more disaggregated approach of lawyers 
meetings drawn from lawyers throughout the administration.201 Some scholars 
have suggested that this decentralization of legal advice must lead to legal 
opportunism, strategic cherry-picking on the part of the President who might 
simply choose his preferred legal advice from among an array of his advisers’ 
suggestions.202 
The image of a unitary executive plucking his preferred legal advice from 
a lineup of his advisers provides an overly simplistic, and inaccurate, account 
of how decision-making functions inside an enormous behemoth such as the 
executive branch. It also misunderstands the consequences of a trajectory away 
from centralized decision-making.  What this and other accounts of executive 
lawyering overlook is that today’s disaggregated approach to legal decision-
 
 198.  It is not clear that Congress could have delegated away that authority entirely, even if it 
intended to do so. 
 199.  See, e.g., Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L. J. 2314, 2316 (2006) (identifying, and proposing a strengething of, the 
internal separation of powers); Gillian Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and 
External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L. J. 423, 426-35 (2009) (hailing the benefits of the internal 
separation of powers, and discussing its interdependency with external checks on the President). 
 200.  New York Times journalist Charlie Savage has even written a 600-plus page popular tome 
on the subject. See SAVAGE, supra note 58. 
 201.  See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The Decline of OLC, LAWFARE (Oct. 28, 2015, 6:11 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/decline-olc.  
 202.  See, e.g., Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive 
Branch Is a They Not an It, 96 MINN. L. REV. 194, 257-60, 267-71 (2011); Bruce Ackerman, Legal 
Acrobatics, Illegal War, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/opinion/21Ackerman.html. 
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making resembles much less one decider choosing among many choices, but 
rather a group of disparate actors with differing instincts, biases, and goals 
working together to make a decision. The result is inevitably one of 
compromise. One of the results of such group decision-making is that when 
these disparate actors cannot agree on one clear position, they will of necessity 
employ ambiguous language to paper over their differences.203 Flexible or 
ambiguous executive legal positions are often not necessarily the result of 
intentional, conscious power grabs, but rather represent the reality of group 
decision-making, and attempts to mask internal disagreement and come to a 
decision for the moment that permits continued debate among the actors until 
they are truly forced to decide. Because of this bias toward flexibility, a 
practice of leaving options open will inevitably, even if unintentionally, lead to 
a ratcheting up of power to the President.204 
And yet, for all the problems inherent in relying on internal constraints to 
check an otherwise all-powerful Executive, in certain very important areas 
these internal constraints may well be our only hope. For the clearest message 
coming out of the co-belligerency story is that the courts and Congress—while 
purporting to provide active oversight of the Executive on this precise matter—
have utterly failed to do so. Despite seeming to ratify the Executive’s theory in 
principle, neither the courts nor Congress have shown sufficient inclination or 
ability to look behind the co-belligerency concept to understand its meaning or 
how the Executive is employing it. 
A cynical view of this account is that Congress and judges have simply 
looked the other way rather than make difficult decisions about the proper 
limits of executive power in war. On this account, reliance on this co-
belligerency concept—which they may not fully understand but which sounds 
in international law and suggests constraint—allows them to do so. A less 
cynical but equally disconcerting narrative might be that judges and members 
of Congress simply do not realize how little they know about co-belligerency 
and how the Executive uses it. Both narratives suggest that reliance on this term 
provides a “façade” of oversight, and that if the only operating constraints on 
the President were from these two branches, his authority in this area would 
truly be a legal grey hole.205 I have therefore used the concept of a greyish 
space in this paper not because of the existence of effective external checks, but 
rather because of evidence that the executive branch has truly operated as if 
constrained to some extent by internal forces enforcing self-imposed limits, at 
least within this amorphous and evolving space that it itself has created. 
CONCLUSION 
Accounts of executive power today, particularly in the murkiest areas of 
national security law, often tend toward either the trusting or the cynical. Either 
 
 203.  See Ingber, supra note 65. 
 204.  Id.  
 205.  See Dyzenhaus, supra note 14 (warning against the existence of legal black holes—
lawless zones—as well as legal grey holes, where “there is the façade or form of the rule of law rather 
than any substantive protections”); Sinnar, supra note 14. 
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the internal organs of the executive branch are working efficiently to guide and 
constrain executive decision-making within legal limits, or else the story is an 
entirely different one of a presidency run rampant, unchecked by the other 
branches, perhaps even spurred from within by nefarious power-hungry 
bureaucrats. 
The reality lies in a middle space. Nefarious actors may exist, but they are 
not the norm. Institutional players may truly see themselves as bound by the 
rule of law, but, in operating so entirely within their closed-off, exclusive, and 
cabined space, it is a rule of law that often only they are truly able to 
understand. (And as this Article explores, even those internal actors do not 
always understand the legal rules they feel constrained by.) Outsiders may see 
in this lack of transparency nefarious intentions. They may see in the lack of 
clear rules an intention to create these grey spaces or even legal black holes, 
rather than an intention to truly constrain the presidency. Neither of these 
accounts gets it precisely right, but that does not mean that the reality has 
settled yet on the appropriate balance. 
This middle space should be no less concerning to those who fear the 
aggrandizement of executive power. Nefarious intentions are not a prerequisite 
to the inexorable ratcheting up of executive claims to authority. Indeed, this 
story suggests challenges for those Presidents who rise to power hoping to rein 
it in. Ultimately, it may be that internal forces simply will never be sufficient as 
the sole constraints on executive power. But until the courts and Congress step 
in, they may well be all we have. 
 
